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ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE: HOW COURTS 
CREATE STATUTORY AMBIGUITY TO 
CONCEAL THEIR APPLICATION OF THE 
ABSURDITY DOCTRINE 
Laura R. Dove* 
Although explicitly invoked only in rare cases, the absurdity doctrine is far 
more robust in practice than commonly assumed. This is because of a phenome-
non I call “absurdity in disguise,” wherein judges use the anomalous or undesir-
able results of applying a statute’s ordinary meaning to “create” statutory ambi-
guity, opening the door to a variety of interpretive tools that would otherwise be 
unavailable. Ironically, the use of ambiguity to conceal the use of the absurdity 
doctrine is a direct result of judges’ increasing acceptance of textualist methods 
of statutory interpretation. Because textualism eschews results-oriented interpre-
tive approaches, judges who wish to avoid a result of applying statutory text as 
written must employ text-centric arguments to do so. This article identifies the 
concept of absurdity in disguise and reveals its use in a variety of decisions at all 
levels of the federal courts. 
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The process of judicial reform requires three steps. The first of these is to di-
vine some single “purpose” which the statute serves. This is done although not 
one statute in a hundred has any such single purpose, and although the objec-
tives of nearly every statute are differently interpreted by the different classes 
of its sponsors. The second step is to discover that a mythical being called “the 
legislator,” in the pursuit of this imagined “purpose,” overlooked something or 
left some gap or imperfection in his work. Then comes the final and most re-
freshing part of the task, which is, of course, to fill in the blank thus created. 
Quod erat faciendum.1 
INTRODUCTION 
That judges make law, rather than merely discover it, has been broadly (if 
grudgingly) acknowledged at least since the advent of legal realism.2 Yet judg-
es’ discomfort in acknowledging this fact—and attempts to obscure their law-
making—have also been well documented.3 Judicial and scholarly proponents 
of textualism, a method of statutory interpretation, are some of the most vocal 
                                                        
1  Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 634 (1949). 
2  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 5 (2012) (“It used to be said that judges do not ‘make’ law—they simply apply it. In 
the 20th century, the legal realists convinced everyone that judges do indeed make law. To 
the extent that this was true, it was knowledge that the wise already possessed and the fool-
ish could not be trusted with.”). 
3  Cf. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical 
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1108 (1992) (“Although the data reveal a role for practical 
considerations, it is quite likely that these figures undercount the role such consequentialist 
concerns play in the Court’s decisionmaking [sic] process. As commentators have repeatedly 
suggested, practical considerations are masked by the invocation of more formal sources of 
authority.”). In the same article, Professor Zeppos noted that originalist interpretive theories 
were based on “claims that fidelity to the enacting legislature is needed to counter anxiety 
over judicial lawmaking” and that “[t]he new textualism seeks to eliminate nontextual 
sources of authority from judicial consideration, also with the goal of constraining the 
judge.” Id. at 1074. However, Professor Zeppos contrasted these views with those of schol-
ars and judges advocating for “dynamic” interpretation methods do not necessarily see judi-
cial lawmaking as an improper end of interpretation. Id. at 1088. But see SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 2, at 5, for the contention that, in contrast to the decision-making process in 
common law cases, “good judges dealing with statutes do not make law. They do not ‘give 
new content’ to the statute, but merely apply the content that has been there all along, await-
ing application to myriad factual scenarios.” Scalia and Garner lament that some judges have 
accepted the invitation to make law improperly under the guise of statutory interpretation. 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 7. 
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in denouncing judicial intrusion into the policy and lawmaking realm of legisla-
tures. Textualism emphasizes the determination of statutory meaning based on 
the ordinary meaning of a statute’s text; it rejects attempts to circumvent or 
even supplement the apparent meaning of statutory text through inquiries into 
the enacting legislature’s intention or purpose.4 For textualists, statutes simply 
mean what they say. 
Scholars have thoroughly documented a strong textualist shift within the 
Supreme Court over the last few decades.5 In light of textualism’s profound in-
fluence, judges are highly attuned to the separation of powers concerns under-
lying the doctrine’s efforts to restrict judicial interference with the legislative 
role. Yet, the gap between what judges do and what they say they do has, per-
haps ironically, only grown with the popularity of textualism as a statutory in-
terpretation method. At first blush, the contention that textualism has widened 
the gap between what judges do and what they purport to do seems counterintu-
itive. One of textualism’s explicit goals is to restrict improper judicial lawmak-
ing.6 If textualism has been so successful, there should be less (improper) law-
making in the first place; therefore, any need to conceal it should likewise have 
diminished. 
To shed light on this paradox, another phenomenon must be examined in 
tandem with the rise of textualism: the declining acceptance of the absurdity 
doctrine.7 The absurdity doctrine is a canon of statutory interpretation holding 
that a statute’s apparent ordinary meaning may be disregarded if the results of 
its application are (in some sense)8 absurd. The conflicts between textualism 
                                                        
4  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 16–17. 
5  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 117, 119 (2009). 
6  As Professor Jonathan Molot has noted, two key inquiries shape the debate over the proper 
scope of the judicial role: (1) the nature of law itself, including “whether judicial leeway is 
considered narrow or broad” and (2) “prevailing views . . . of the constitutional structure 
and, specifically, on whether judges are viewed as ‘faithful agents’ or ‘coequal partners’ of 
Congress.” Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2006). Professor Molot traces the history of modern textualism through these lenses and 
describes how modern textualism arose from the desire to minimize judicial leeway in inter-
pretation, coupled with an emphasis on the constitutional structure grounded in the separa-
tion of powers, and requiring bicameralism and presentment. See id. at 16, 23–27 (“Indeed, 
textualism is best understood as one of a series of responses to this newfound appreciation of 
interpretive leeway and of the judiciary’s limited role in the constitutional structure.”). I use 
the phrase “improper judicial lawmaking” to refer to the proper scope of judicial power as 
conceived of by textualists. Textualism’s success is, in large part, attributable to its propo-
nents’ ability to persuade others of the legitimacy of this view of the judicial role. See id. at 
29–31. 
7  Even the most avowed textualists continue to accept at least some version of the absurdity 
doctrine. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 234 (including a section on the ab-
surdity doctrine as an appropriate canon of statutory interpretation). The “decline” I have 
referenced is with respect to the willingness of judges to employ the doctrine, not in their 
overall acceptance of the doctrine’s appropriateness in some instances. This decline is exam-
ined in further detail in infra Part I. 
8  The precise scope of the absurdity doctrine remains unsettled. See infra Section I.B. 
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and at least some iterations of the absurdity doctrine have been well document-
ed in the literature.9 Modern judges typically eschew all but the most narrow 
versions of the absurdity doctrine, requiring a statute’s plain meaning to be pa-
tently illogical or insensible in order to justify applying the doctrine.10 Other-
wise, they contend, the judiciary risks overstepping its constitutional limitations 
by ignoring plain meaning11 where it entails an outcome seemingly contrary to 
the overall statutory purpose or policy. Absurdity’s willingness to subvert a 
statute’s clear meaning to avoid an undesirable result obviously clashes with 
textualism’s admonitions regarding the dangers of results-oriented decision-
making. Yet, as scholars have pointed out, textualism essentially requires some 
version of the absurdity doctrine in order to avoid truly untenable interpreta-
tions or applications of apparently clear statutes. 
Textualism’s combination of textual primacy and strict limits on the use of 
the absurdity doctrine significantly constrain judges’ discretion to look beyond 
a statute’s text during the interpretive process in order to achieve results 
thought by a judge to be fair, consistent with statutory purpose, or consistent 
with legislative intent. However, textualism’s success12 has had an unintended 
and potentially counterproductive consequence. Judges, wary of appearing 
overly “results-oriented” by liberally applying the absurdity doctrine, have 
seized upon an interpretive rule with broader acceptance that ultimately permits 
them to achieve the same result: ambiguity. 
Once a statute is determined to be ambiguous, even textualists generally 
consult a much broader range of sources as interpretive aids than would other-
                                                        
9  See infra Part I. 
10  See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 234. 
11  Throughout this article, I use the terms “plain meaning” and “ordinary meaning” inter-
changeably, consistent with the usage of many modern courts and scholars. See Linda D. 
Jellum, But That is Absurd! Why Specific Absurdity Undermines Textualism, 76 BROOK. L. 
REV. 917, 921 n.23 (2011). However, some scholars distinguish between ordinary meaning 
and plain meaning, typically attributing a search for ordinary meaning to “modern” or “new” 
textualists, while using plain meaning to distinguish earlier approaches to interpretation that 
lacked the modern emphasis on context and linguistic use conventions. See, e.g., Lawrence 
M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2030–32 (2005). 
12  Here, I refer to success in terms of influence: “Textualists have spent three decades con-
vincing judges of all political stripes to come along for the ride, and have had enormous suc-
cess in establishing ‘text-first’ interpretation as the general norm.” See Abbe R. Gluck, Sym-
posium: The Grant in King—Obamacare Subsidies as Textualism’s Big Test, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Nov. 7, 2014, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium-the-grant-in-kin 
g-obamacare-subsidies-as-textualisms-big-test/ [https://perma.cc/VF4E-QAZG]; see also 
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 
351, 353–57 (1994) (reviewing existing and offering new contributions to the empirical evi-
dence of textualism’s influence and concluding that “there can be no doubt that textualism 
has asserted a powerful hold over the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation jurispru-
dence”). While there has been ongoing, strenuous debate over textualism’s legitimacy since 
the doctrine’s inception, even its detractors acknowledge its pervasive influence on interpre-
tation in judicial practice and in the academic literature. 
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wise be permissible.13 Thus, if the “hurdle” of ambiguity can be overcome, 
judges are afforded greater discretion than they would be if hampered by a 
finding of plain meaning—which, given the current narrow version of the ab-
surdity doctrine, must be applied absent extreme circumstances. The rise of tex-
tualism and decline of the absurdity doctrine have created an incentive for 
judges to find that the language of a statute is ambiguous. By so doing, I will 
argue, courts are able to achieve results virtually identical to those possible if a 
judge determined that a statute’s meaning was plain and then proceeded to ap-
ply some version of the absurdity doctrine. At the same time, by framing their 
decisions in linguistic, rather than policy considerations, judges minimize the 
appearance of acting outside the judicial role. Statutory purpose, policy goals, 
and outcomes can all be considered; contradictory text is supplanted even as its 
preeminence is exalted. Thus, I refer to this phenomenon as “absurdity in dis-
guise.”14 
This article explores how the confluence of modern versions of textualism 
and the absurdity doctrine contributed to the jurisprudential shift I call absurdi-
ty in disguise. In Part I, I describe the uncomfortable fit between textualism and 
the absurdity doctrine in further detail, outlining their conflicting justifications 
and policies. In Part II, I describe the phenomenon of absurdity in disguise and 
explain how the creation of statutory ambiguity enables judges to obtain the 
same results as if the absurdity doctrine were openly applied. In Part III, I dis-
cuss several recent cases in which absurdity in disguise can be observed. The 
cases involve statutes displaying classic symptoms of absurdity, including stat-
utes that appear to be too broad or too narrow for their applications to be con-
sistent with the statute’s likely intended reach. 
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN TEXTUALISM AND THE ABSURDITY DOCTRINE 
Even avowedly textualist judges generally accept at least some version of 
the absurdity doctrine as an appropriate tool of statutory construction.15 How-
ever, modern textualists strictly circumscribe the doctrine’s use.16 Below, in 
Section I.A, I summarize the basic contours of textualism as an approach to 
statutory interpretation. Section I.B outlines the absurdity doctrine and the well-
documented conflict between its focus on the results of statutory application 
and textualist theories of statutory interpretation. 
                                                        
13  See infra Part II. 
14  It should be noted at the outset that the emerging jurisprudential shift discussed here has 
been noted in recent scholarship and other commentary. However, much of the existing liter-
ature identifies this shift with an outright rejection of textualism, or at least a moderation of 
textualism, in favor of purposivism. 
15  See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 234 (including a section on the absurdity 
doctrine as an appropriate canon of statutory interpretation); see also Andrew S. Gold, Ab-
surd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25 (2006); 
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003). 
16  See, e.g., Manning, supra note 15. 
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A. Textualist Interpretation and Textualism’s Rise 
Although certainly not immune from controversy, textualism has had a 
marked and incontrovertible impact on the theory and practice of statutory in-
terpretation.17 Though many of the Supreme Court justices serving after the ad-
vent of textualism might reject the textualist label, the Court has made clear 
that statutory text is to predominate in the search for meaning: “Our task is to 
construe what Congress has enacted. We begin, as always, with the language of 
the statute.”18 Textualism’s broad influence in the courts has been documented 
by scholars19 and acknowledged by judges themselves: in a 2015 lecture at 
Harvard Law School, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan asserted, “ ‘we’re all 
textualists now.’ ”20 
As an approach to statutory interpretation, textualism seeks to determine a 
text’s “ordinary” or “plain” meaning, based on the meaning that a reasonable 
reader of the language would have ascribed to the text at the time it was enact-
ed into law.21 Early textualist doctrine differed markedly from what is com-
monly described as “modern” or “new” textualism. Specifically, earlier textual-
ists tended to focus on statutes’ literal (or, arguably, hyper-literal) meaning. 
This rigid approach was the root of the idea of “plain meaning.” Early courts 
                                                        
17  See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 31; Gluck, supra note 12. 
18  Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 
431 (2000); Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 175 (1989); Watt v. Energy 
Action Ed. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 162 (1981)). In another case, the Court noted, “As we have 
repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or 
any other extrinsic material.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 
568 (2005). 
19  See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 3, 32–34 (noting that “textualism has so succeeded in 
discrediting strong purposivism that it has led even nonadherents to give great weight to 
statutory text” and citing empirical and anecdotal evidence in support). 
20  See Richard M. Re, Justice Kagan on Textualism’s Success, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 7, 
2015, 8:00 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/12/justice-kagan-on-textu 
alisms-victory.html [https://perma.cc/NW63-7YJ9]. 
21  See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 27–28 (2d ed. 2013); 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 69; Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 (2006); Manning, supra note 15, at 2396. Textualists will, 
however, apply technical meanings to statutory terms if the context indicates a word is used 
as a “term of art.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 76. In Reading Law, Justice Antonin 
Scalia and Bryan A. Garner’s exposition of Justice Scalia’s textualism, the authors call this 
approach the “fair reading method.” Id. at 33. Professor John F. Manning, a noted textualist 
scholar, attributes this conception of plain meaning to “modern” textualism, in contrast with 
older textual theories claiming that plain meaning referred to situations where statutory text 
was so clear that interpretation was unnecessary. Manning, supra note 15, at 2396. As Jus-
tice Scalia was textualism’s most prominent adherent, I describe the ordinary meaning in-
quiry in the terms he and coauthor Bryan Garner offered in Reading Law. However, textual-
ist interpretation need not conform to this approach, which fixes meaning at the time it was 
enacted by a legislature. Alternatively, meaning could be ascribed in light of how a reasona-
ble reader would currently interpret statutory text, making meaning “dynamic” as it shifts 
over time. For a short overview of the controversy over static versus dynamic statutory 
meaning and citations to relevant literature, see Molot, supra note 6, at 31 n.133–34. 
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frequently referenced the lack of any need for interpretation where statutory 
language was plain, viewing application as automatic in those instances.22 
Modern textualists, in contrast, reject the proposition that interpretation is 
unnecessary in some instances: “Every application of a text to particular cir-
cumstances entails interpretation.”23 Modern textualists recognize that language 
is a social construct, drawing on work in philosophy of language originating 
with Wittgenstein.24 Here, the inquiry shifts from the purely definitional to one 
of conventional and accepted social use.25 Moreover, modern textualists em-
phasize that meaning is shaped by context and the many background assump-
tions shared by speakers and listeners.26 Hence, some scholars employ the term 
“ordinary meaning” to distinguish the inquiry of modern textualists from that of 
the earlier “literalist” textualists.27 As John Manning has argued, this more ho-
listic, contextual version of textualism significantly reduces the need to resort 
to fail-safes such as the absurdity doctrine.28 
Thus, for modern textualists, common understandings and the linguistic 
usage conventions of statutory terms are of paramount concern.29 The approach 
is portrayed by its proponents as a positive (objective, descriptive) enterprise, 
grounded in linguistic, social, and historical analysis.30 Textualism can be con-
                                                        
22  See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 34–35. 
23  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 53. 
24  Manning, supra note 15, at 2396. 
25  See Solan, supra note 11, at 2030 (contrasting “plain meaning, as found in dictionary def-
initions” with “ordinary meaning,” which incorporates the context of a statement while still 
being able to avoid resort to extratextual sources); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Mean-
ing of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1235, 1240 (2015). 
26  Disagreements abound over which contextual factors and background assumptions are 
appropriate for interpreters to consider. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 21. 
27  See, e.g., JELLUM, supra note 21, at 27–28; Manning, supra note 15, at 2392; Solan, supra 
note 11. 
28  See Manning, supra note 15, at 2455 (arguing that modern textualism retains “substantial 
means to address many of the problems traditionally handled by the absurdity doctrine” in 
part because of its emphasis on “the context-dependent meaning of texts” rather than a focus 
on “literal statutory interpretation”) (emphasis in original). 
29  Id. at 2396 n.29. 
30  See SCALIA AND GARNER, supra note 2, at 33. Modern textualists generally recognize that 
interpretation does require the exercise of judgment and may, for instance, require a choice 
among competing interpretive canons. See, e.g., id. at xxix, 59 (acknowledging that 
“[t]extualism will not relieve judges of all doubts and misgivings about their interpretations. 
Judging is inherently difficult, and language notoriously slippery,” and that part of the judg-
ment required entails evaluating and choosing among potentially competing canons of con-
struction). However, textualists portray these exercises as grounded in linguistic norms and 
historical inquiry—with the implication being that these criteria are more objective than ju-
dicial policy preferences (or a judge’s understanding of a legislature’s intentions or policy 
goals). See Merrill, supra note 12, at 352, 354 (arguing that textualism’s “critical assumption 
is that interpretation should be objective rather than subjective” in contrast with efforts to 
discern legislative intent, but calling the empirical basis of Justice Scalia’s claim of objec-
tivity “doubtful”). The textualist implication that the canons are less manipulable than any 
other criteria has been criticized for decades. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the 
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trasted with intentionalism, under which a statute’s meaning is determined by 
inquiring into what the legislature intended the statute to mean at the time it 
was enacted.31 A third approach, purposivism, focuses on interpreting statutory 
language consistent with the statute’s broader purposes or policy goals in light 
of the problems the statute was enacted to rectify.32 
One factor distinguishing the three approaches is the extent to which pro-
ponents of each are willing to venture into sources outside of the statutory text 
to uncover evidence of a statute’s meaning.33 Textualists tend to be the most 
restrictive of the three.34 For textualists, where a statute is unambiguous, its 
plain or ordinary meaning is virtually the end of the matter.35 Textualists reject 
the use of legislative history36 and other extratextual sources of statutory pur-
                                                                                                                                
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Con-
strued, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 647–
48 (1992). Moreover, scholars have argued that even judges considering only text would re-
tain significant discretion. Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1091. 
31  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at xxvii. Professor Linda D. Jellum describes inten-
tionalism as focusing on the “specific intent” of the legislators—i.e. what the legislators had 
in mind with regard to the particular issue before the court. JELLUM, supra note 21, at 33–34. 
In contrast, a legislature’s “general intent,” the legislature’s broader goal or overall purpose, 
is sought by purposivists. Id. at 34. 
32  See JELLUM, supra note 21, at 38–41. Purposivism lies at the heart of Hart and Sacks’ le-
gal process school and emphasizes the reasonableness and coherence of the body of law as a 
whole. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994). 
33  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1973 (2007) (noting that textualism resolves “textual uncertain-
ty[] without relying on extrinsic evidence such as legislative history” and that the theory it-
self “is broadly accepted as an interpretive methodology, the controversy is over its exclusiv-
ism”). 
34  See generally id.; JELLUM, supra note 21, at 33–35; see also Greene, supra note 21, at 
1924–25 (describing seven textualist arguments for cutting off “extratextual knowledge” in-
cluding legislative history). 
35  See, e.g., Cross, supra note 33, at 1972 (“Textualists argue that the meaning of a statute 
can be discerned entirely from the words used in the law under consideration.”). The influ-
ence that this textualist proposition has had on the Supreme Court as a whole is evident in 
Justice Thomas’ majority opinion in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62 
(2002) (citations omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 
(1992)): 
Our role is to interpret the language of the statute enacted by Congress. This statute does not 
contain conflicting provisions or ambiguous language. Nor does it require a narrowing construc-
tion or application of any other canon or interpretative tool. “We have stated time and again that 
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what 
it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 
‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ” 
36  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 34. “As we have said, in a fair reading, purpose—
as a constituent of meaning—is to be derived exclusively from a text.” Id. Several scholars 
including Professor Jellum have noted that textualists do not hold this view uniformly; some, 
more “moderate” textualists would look to legislative history and other extrinsic sources. 
JELLUM, supra note 21, at 28. However, under what she calls “strict” or “new” textualism, 
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pose to supplement or alter clear statutory text.37 Modern judges favoring other 
interpretive approaches frequently begin with the language of a statute, but 
consider these and other extratextual sources appropriate indicators of meaning 
to resolve statutory ambiguity.38 
One primary justification textualists raise in support of their approach is 
that its focus on ordinary meaning results in a more objective analysis than ap-
proaches that seek to determine a legislative body’s intentions or purposes.39 
Textualists argue that ordinary meaning is far less malleable than legislative 
intent or purpose, meaning that judges are properly more constrained in deter-
mining what a statute means and how it applies in a given case. Less malleabil-
ity means that judges are less able to inject their own policy or outcome prefer-
ences into the interpretive inquiry; instead, textualists contend, such matters are 
reserved to the province of the legislature consistent with separation of powers 
                                                                                                                                
and what Scalia and Garner call “pure textualism,” these sources are off-limits even where a 
statute is ambiguous. Id. at 29–30; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at xxix. The role of leg-
islative history was traditionally at the crux of arguments among textualists and proponents 
of other approaches. However, Professor Manning and others have noted the development of 
new avenues for debate, resulting to some extent in the diminishment of the centrality of the 
legislative history issue. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 34–35 (using the example of legis-
lative history to illustrate his argument that the differences between modern textualism and 
purposivism are exaggerated); see also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 
CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1289–90 (2010) (noting that the major focus of what he refers to as “sec-
ond-generation textualists” has shifted away from the general question of whether to use leg-
islative history). 
37  See Manning, supra note 36, at 1289–90. Professor Frank B. Cross has referred to those 
textualists who reject the use of extrinsic evidence to supplement statutory language as 
“strict textualists.” See Cross, supra note 33, at 1973. Professor Johnathan T. Molot has de-
scribed such textualist approaches as “aggressive” textualism. See Molot, supra note 6, at 48. 
As Professor Jellum has noted, however, textualists do not generally reject all sources out-
side the statutory text—for instance, textualists widely accept the use of dictionaries and em-
ploy a variety of canons of construction to resolve the meaning of statutory terms. JELLUM, 
supra note 21, at 27. 
38  Even some textualists may utilize legislative history when confronted with statutory am-
biguity, although in a more circumscribed manner than the traditional use of legislative his-
tory to discern a legislature’s intent. In his majority opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapat-
tah Servs., Inc., Justice Kennedy noted that the court had “repeatedly held” that “the 
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic 
material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they 
shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous 
terms.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). However, 
he went on to criticize the use of legislative history based on a variety of textualist arguments 
and noted the disagreement among the Court regarding whether those problems warranted a 
blanket refusal to consider legislative history under any circumstances. See id. at 568–69. 
39  See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 4–10, 17–18. But see William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 533 (2013) (re-
viewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (“Critics of the new textualism claim that its methodology is no more 
constraining than a methodology that considers legislative history as an interpretive aid.”); 
Greene, supra note 21, at 1928 (arguing that “insisting that judges look just at ordinary 
meaning of statutory text (even in context), without seeking additional extratextual infor-
mation about what the text means, can open a gaping hole for judicial willfulness.”). 
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principles. This separation of powers justification is one of the foremost argu-
ments raised in support of textualism.40 Additionally, more objective, predicta-
ble outcomes enhance the rule of law.41 
Further, many textualists challenge the very existence of legislative inten-
tions or coherent legislative purposes to uncover. This contention is grounded 
in public choice and social choice theories, first proposed by economists to ex-
plain and describe legislative behavior and outcomes.42 Essentially, these theo-
ries portray legislation as the product of compromises among competing inter-
est groups necessary to secure the votes required for a bill’s passage.43 As a 
result of these compromises, legislation may not correspond precisely to an 
overall purpose or policy goal.44 The qualities of the legislative process under-
lie textualists’ commitment: even where a statute’s ordinary meaning appears 
anomalous, or inconsistent with the apparent purpose of the statute, textualists 
nevertheless apply the statute as written. 
Thus, textualism’s appeal rests largely on its purported ability to restrain 
judicial discretion in the interpretation of statutes.45 Proponents argue that its 
focus on the ordinary meaning of statutory text minimizes improper judicial 
lawmaking through the creation of the statutory “gap[s] or imperfection[s]” ref-
erenced in the quoted passage at the beginning of this article.46 In theory, judg-
                                                        
40  See Manning, supra note 15, at 2389 n.6. 
41  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 4, 6, 10, 17–18. “ ‘[I]t is not too much to say that 
the preference for the rule of law over the rule of men depends upon the intellectual integrity 
of interpretation.’ ” Id. at xxix (alteration in original) (quoting GARY L. MCDOWELL, Intro-
duction to POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF INTERPRETATION 
vii, vii (1990)). 
42  See Manning, supra note 36, at 1292 (discussing interest group theory and social choice 
theory as two aspects of the broader discipline of public choice); see also Manning, supra 
note 15, at 2410–19. 
43  See Manning, supra note 15, at 2410–19. 
44  See id. 
45  See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1081 (“By limiting the courts to textual sources, textualism 
seeks to eliminate value choice in judging: the text alone will dictate a result.”). 
46  In his relatively early 1992 analysis of textualism as an emerging theory of interpretation, 
Professor Zeppos summarized the textualist contention as follows: 
Textualists argue that the potentially wide array of originalist sources (especially legislative his-
tory) gives judges the freedom to justify (and hide) any policy decision. Thus, originalism only 
encourages judges to stray from their preferably narrow function of . . . enforcing the text of 
laws enacted by the legislature. 
Id. at 1086–87. Professor Zeppos defined “originalism”—which he characterized as the 
dominant interpretive approach until the emergence of various criticisms such as textual-
ism—as a method that “resolves interpretive questions in statutory cases by asking how the 
enacting Congress would have decided the question.” Id. at 1078. Thus, the “originalism” 
discussed here is consistent with what scholars typically now refer to as intentionalism. See, 
e.g., JELLUM, supra note 21, at 35. Although some strands of purposivism might emphasize a 
legislature’s actual, subjective purpose (perhaps contrasted with legislative intent as broad or 
general policy goals rather than intended applications in specific cases), purposivism can 
also be conceived of as a legal process-type stylized construction of the purpose that could 
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es should have less room to supplant a legislature’s policy preferences with 
their own in determining the meaning of statutory text.47 Legislative outcomes 
are a matter of public policy; as such, their consideration is a matter for legisla-
tive debate and resolution and not the concern of the courts. Unless, of course, 
the result of applying a statute’s ordinary meaning is absurd. For textualists, the 
absurdity doctrine provides one of the only justifications for applying a statute 
in a way that is inconsistent with the statute’s ordinary meaning.48 
B. The Absurdity Doctrine 
The absurdity doctrine permits courts to disregard or modify unambiguous 
statutory text where the application of its apparent meaning would produce ab-
surd results.49 A frequently cited example of absurdity is found in Amalgamat-
ed Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Service, Inc., in which the 
Ninth Circuit interpreted the word “less” to mean “more” in a federal statute 
whose plain language essentially created a waiting period, rather than a dead-
line, for filing an appeal.50 An underlying theme in absurdity cases is that the 
apparently clear language of a statute can’t possibly mean what it says. Some 
cases, like Amalgamated Transit, involve apparent error or mistake; here, the 
absurdity doctrine overlaps significantly with the doctrine of scrivener’s error.51 
Another frequent cause of statutory absurdity is statutory vagueness, particular-
                                                                                                                                
be attributed to reasonable legislators pursuing reasonable goals. See Manning, supra note 
15, at 2398–99. 
47  See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1086–87. 
48  See generally Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. L. REV. 811 (2016) (not-
ing that a related doctrine, scrivener’s error, is an additional justification for departing from 
plain text). 
49  Manning, supra note 15, at 2388. In what has become a classic statement on the doctrine, 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868) held: 
The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian 
law which enacted, “that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost 
severity,” did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the 
street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 
1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of a felony, does 
not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire—“for he is not to be hanged 
because he would not stay to be burnt.” And we think that a like common sense will sanction the 
ruling we make, that the act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the pas-
sage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail 
caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder. 
Id. at 2388. 
50  Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 
1145–46 (9th Cir. 2006). 
51  See Manning, supra note 15, at 2459 n.265 (describing the doctrine of scrivener’s error as 
“apparently a form of the absurdity doctrine”); see also Doerfler, supra note 48, at 816 (de-
scribing scrivener’s errors as cases where “the words of a legislative text diverge from what 
Congress meant to say”). 
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ly overbreadth.52 This may be a problem broadly or only with respect to appli-
cation in specific instances.53 
The precise scope of the absurdity doctrine remains unsettled. “Cases using 
or referring to the principle do not define absurdity, nor do they specify the 
kinds of situations where the principle should be applied.”54 A primary disa-
greement centers around the question of how absurd a result must be to justify 
disregarding a statute’s ordinary meaning.55 Scholars have identified and evalu-
ated various possible conceptions of the doctrine, ranging from “true” absurdity 
as a matter of formal logic, to absurd in the sense that the result of applying a 
statute as written offends our sense of justice or fairness.56 One prominent tex-
tualist scholar defines absurdity as “a version of strong intentionalism” because 
of a common definition of an absurd result is one “so contrary to perceived so-
cial values that Congress could not have ‘intended’ it.”57 
The doctrine’s usage has been traced to the very beginnings of the Ameri-
can Republic,58 and it “has been one of the few fixed points in the Court’s fre-
quently shifting interpretive regimes.”59 In fact, the propriety of the doctrine’s 
use under at least some circumstances is widely accepted, even among judges 
who otherwise rarely advocate departure from unambiguous text.60 The doc-
trine’s scope, however, has vacillated significantly over time. The seminal case 
                                                        
52  A classic example of statutory overbreadth leading to an arguably absurd result is the case 
of Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989). In that case, a Federal Rule 
of Evidence purportedly applied to all “defendants,” not just civil defendants, which would 
have prioritized civil defendants over civil plaintiffs in application, raising questions of con-
stitutionality. See id. at 509–11. In Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, he specifically in-
voked the absurdity doctrine: “We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted 
literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional result.” Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., con-
curring). He found that interpreting “defendant” more narrowly to mean “criminal defend-
ant” was an acceptable interpretation that did the “least violence” to the text. Id. at 529. 
53  Professor Jellum described both Green and Holy Trinity Church as cases involving “gen-
eral absurdity,” i.e. ones which are “absurd regardless of the particular situation before the 
court.” Jellum, supra note 11, at 930. Both cases involve instances of arguable statutory 
overbreadth. On the other hand, some cases she describes as instances of “specific absurdi-
ty”—i.e. those where “the applicable statutes are perfectly logical in the abstract, but [absurd 
when] applied to the specific facts of the case before the court”—also involve arguable over-
breadth. Id. at 932. For instance, a statute prohibiting escapes from prison is generally un-
controversial, but becomes problematic when a prisoner escapes in order to save himself 
from a fire. The statute in that specific case seems broader than its intended reach. See id. 
54  See Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd 
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 128 (1994). 
55  See id. 
56  See id. at 140–41, 150–51. 
57  Manning, supra note 15, at 2390; accord Gold, supra note 15, at 25–27. 
58  See generally Manning, supra note 15. 
59  See id. at 2389. 
60  See id. at 2388–89; see also Dougherty, supra note 54, at 128. 
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on the absurdity doctrine, the oft-maligned61 Holy Trinity Church v. United 
States,62 perhaps marks the broadest conception of the doctrine.63 In that case, 
the Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the Alien Contract Labor Act pro-
hibiting bringing people from other countries to the United States “to perform 
labor or service of any kind” not to apply to the services of a pastor brought in-
to the country by the church.64 The Court (in)famously ruled that although the 
pastor’s services fell within the letter of the law, “a thing may be within the let-
ter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor 
within the intention of its makers.”65 
No matter one’s view of the wisdom of a statute broadly prohibiting the 
importation of “laborers,” it is clear that the statute’s plain meaning does not 
rise to the level of absurdity that textualists would require before disregarding 
the text. The version of the absurdity doctrine accepted by Justice Scalia would 
require both that the claimed absurdity “consist of a disposition that no reason-
able person could intend” and that it “be reparable by changing or supplying a 
particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a tech-
nical or ministerial error.”66 Not only is the hurdle envisioned “very high,” the 
doctrine as envisioned here would categorically refuse to address “substantive 
errors” arising as a result of the application of a statute to particular circum-
stances.67 
Notably, Holy Trinity Church is alternatively described as exemplifying the 
high point of the absurdity doctrine and the high point of purposivist interpreta-
tion more generally.68 This conceptual overlap is especially telling in light of 
modern purposivists’ reluctance to subvert the import of apparently clear statu-
tory text in favor of the purpose of the statute, even where the two directly con-
flict.69 Instead, modern purposivists generally delve into purpose only to clarify 
statutory ambiguity. This limitation, another outgrowth of textualism’s rise in 
popularity, has contributed to the erection of the ambiguity “hurdle” that stands 
                                                        
61  See Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 472–74 (1989) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring); see also Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, 
Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 905–06 (2000). 
62  Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
63  See Jellum, supra note 11, at 925–26 (noting that Holy Trinity Church “expanded Kirby’s 
narrow absurdity doctrine”). 
64  Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 458. 
65  Id. at 459. 
66  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 237–38. 
67  See id. In that sense, the doctrine here is effectively indistinguishable from the related 
“scrivener’s error” canon. 
68  See Manning, supra note 15, at 2403 (calling Holy Trinity Church one of the “classic[],” 
“leading,” and “most influential” absurdity cases, while describing the absurdity doctrine as 
a version of “strong intentionalism”); Molot, supra note 6, at 14 (describing the case as 
“[t]he most famous, influential example of the Court’s bold purposivism in federal statutory 
interpretation during [the] period . . . .”). 
69  See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113 (2011). 
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in the way of fuller purposive or results-oriented inquiries and led to the phe-
nomenon of ambiguity in disguise. 
As noted, in contrast to Holy Trinity Church, more recent opinions of the 
Court have endorsed substantially narrower iterations of the absurdity doctrine. 
This modern conception of the absurdity doctrine goes beyond individual, 
avowedly textualist justices such as Justice Scalia. In 2011, tracing the history 
of the doctrine’s use, Professor Linda Jellum noted that the Supreme Court had 
“explicitly relied on the absurdity doctrine only five times” since 1989.70 In a 
majority opinion, the Supreme Court has described the doctrine as one to be 
used only “rarely” and as a last resort.71 The Court has ruled that even the pos-
sibility of an “unintentional drafting gap” is insufficient to warrant judicial cor-
rection; correction is the province of Congress in cases where an admittedly 
“anomalous” result “may seem odd, but . . . is not absurd.”72 It is not enough 
that applying the unambiguous language lead to “counter-intuitive” results to 
warrant the invocation of the absurdity doctrine.73 
The Court’s hesitancy to employ the absurdity doctrine to disregard a stat-
ute’s plain language is likely attributable to the rise of textualism as an ap-
proach to statutory interpretation.74 This is unsurprising given the absurdity 
doctrine’s close relationship with purposivism—to reject one is, in many re-
spects, to reject the other. The following section identifies in further detail the 
friction between textualism and the absurdity doctrine. 
C. Textualism and the Absurdity Doctrine: In Tension at Best, Irreconcilable 
at Worst 
To reiterate, textualists maintain that their approach minimizes judicial pol-
icymaking; textualists focus solely on what a statute, as written, means, leaving 
the question of whether its application is desirable to the domain of the legisla-
ture. Whether the outcome of applying a statute is “desirable” is, in many re-
spects, a policy question of whether a statute should govern in certain circum-
stances. Averring that such policy decisions are the province of legislatures 
rather than courts, textualists invoke separation of powers arguments to require 
that, at least insofar as statutes are clear, they must be interpreted and applied as 
                                                        
70  Jellum, supra note 11, at 926. 
71  See id. at 926–27 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 441 (2002)). 
72  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005). The Court also 
noted in its holding that: 
This is not a case where one can plausibly say that concerned legislators might not have realized 
the possible effect of the text they were adopting. Certainly, any competent legislative aide who 
studied the matter would have flagged this issue if it were a matter of importance to his or her 
boss, especially in light of the Subcommittee Working Paper. There are any number of reasons 
why legislators did not spend more time arguing over [the statute], none of which are relevant to 
our interpretation of what the words of the statute mean. 
Id. at 571. 
73  See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002). 
74  See Manning, supra note 69, at 113–14. 
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written. The desirability of the results of applying statutes in specific cases is to 
play no role in determining their meanings. Though modern textualism consid-
ers context, in this sense a strict separation is attempted between what statutory 
language means and its import in application. 
Herein lies the root of the conflict between textualism and the absurdity 
doctrine.75 The absurdity doctrine is avowedly results-oriented; textualists gen-
erally reject consideration of such results as constitutionally problematic. Yet 
even the most committed textualists acknowledge that results cannot be ignored 
in every instance. As several scholars have thoroughly documented, the absurd-
ity doctrine provides a sort of “fail-safe” for textualists in the event that their 
commitment to the text becomes unacceptably unpalatable. But, as John Man-
ning notes, “[i]f modern textualists perceive their methodology to be workable 
only because of the availability of the absurdity doctrine, then one must ques-
tion the conceptual foundations of textualism itself.”76 Linda Jellum made this 
tension the focus of an entire article, contending that “absurdity and textualism 
are simply incompatible; indeed, the absurdity doctrine undermines the very 
foundation of textualism.”77 William Eskridge has made the point that if the ab-
surdity doctrine is acceptable to textualists, there is no sound justification for 
adhering to ordinary meaning even where a result seems merely unreasonable, 
as opposed to patently absurd.78 
Despite the apparent contradictions, however, early textualists evidently 
applied the absurdity doctrine frequently—in tracing the doctrine’s develop-
ment, Professor Jellum notes that it “was commonly used up until the 1940s as 
a way to temper the sometimes harsh effects of the plain meaning canon in its 
literalist formulation.”79 In a following intentionalist period, Professor Jellum 
notes that “the plain meaning canon fell from favor; and thus, the absurdity 
doctrine faded briefly into obscurity.”80 The advent of modern textualism—
which scholars frequently trace to at or near the time of Justice Scalia’s ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court81—renewed the utility of the absurdity doc-
trine.82 Yet, the modern Court has been far less willing to employ it, at the same 
                                                        
75  And perhaps, as noted above, between textualism and “strong” (i.e., not modern) pur-
posivism. 
76  Manning, supra note 15, at 2392. 
77  Jellum, supra note 11, at 919. 
78  See Manning, supra note 15, at 2411 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 26–27 (1994)). 
79  Jellum, supra note 11, at 926. 
80  Id. 
81  See id. (tracing modern textualism to 1986, when Justice Scalia was appointed); Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and 
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995) (“During the 
period 1982–1992, the Court decreased its use of intentionalism and increased its use of tex-
tualism.”). 
82  See Jellum, supra note 11, at 926; Pierce, supra note 81, at 750. 
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time that many of the justices feel obligated to pay homage to ordinary mean-
ing.83 
This is, no doubt, attributable in part to the important modifications to the 
old plain meaning rule that modern textualists have made; the ordinary mean-
ing inquiry is fuller and richer than the surface glance that characterized plain 
meaning. Although the modern emphasis on social usage conventions is viewed 
by textualists as an objective inquiry, none would deny that it is an inquiry—
the interpretive process is not automatic. Even unambiguous texts are viewed as 
requiring analysis, placement within context, and deliberation. To the extent the 
absurdity doctrine was required to remedy “hyper-literal” interpretations, it 
may simply be less needed under modern textualism. 
On the other hand, another explanation for the Court’s reluctance to rely on 
absurdity is likely the justices’ intuition (consistent with the arguments made 
by Professors Manning and Jellum, among others) that textualism84 itself is un-
dermined by the need for the absurdity doctrine and the doctrine’s application. 
Many of the core justifications underlying modern textualism seem to entail an 
extremely high threshold for absurdity in order to justify disregarding a stat-
ute’s ordinary meaning. In particular, the arguments based on public and social 
choice theory described in the previous section indicate that judges should be 
extremely wary of potentially undermining the policy decisions of the legisla-
ture. Public and social choice theories theoretically normalize legislative out-
comes that are “merely” odd, anomalous, ill-conceived, illogical, not ideal, or 
even silly. Oddities may not be simple mistakes; instead, they might represent a 
hard-won legislative compromise or crucial negotiated point. And, if the statu-
tory scheme or body of law as a whole is not quite neat or coherent, that’s to be 
expected, too—after all, we can’t expect rational outcomes in collective deci-
sion-making in the first place.85 
Further, many of the formalist underpinnings of textualism come into play 
at this point to counsel against judicial “correction” of less-than-absurd results, 
through, for example, the imposition of legal process-type assumptions of “rea-
                                                        
83  See Pierce, supra note 81, at 752. 
84  Here, “textualism” is used largely as a shorthand and not to suggest that most Supreme 
Court justices would self-identify as textualist or be overly concerned about undermining 
“textualism” itself. Instead, the point here is that despite the controversy it engenders, textu-
alism has notably influenced the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation. Much 
of this influence is likely due to concerns over avoiding excess judicial discretion, maintain-
ing separation of powers, and the like. Additionally, public and social choice theories, along 
with the law and economics discipline broadly, have influenced the courts both jointly with 
and independently of textualism. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 
1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039–40 (1997) (tracing the influence of interest 
group theory and public choice theory in Supreme Court decision-making in a variety of 
agency contexts). All of these factors contribute to both textualism’s rise and absurdity’s de-
cline. 
85  For John Manning’s discussion of social choice theory see Manning, supra note 15, at 
2412–19. 
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sonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes, reasonably.”86 Textualists argue 
that the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment preclude 
judges from revising the text that was actually produced by Congress and ap-
proved by both Congress and the President. And, again, once it is accepted that 
the legislative process may inherently produce anomalies—that these may be 
“intended” (in some sense)87 rather than the result of inadequate foresight or 
ineffective expression—commitment to legislative supremacy88 seems to man-
date deference to the bargains struck. 
Finally, the absurdity doctrine’s conceptual closeness with purposivism of-
fers insight into the inverse paths of textualism and absurdity. The unabashed 
consideration of outcomes in light of an enacting legislature’s likely (or per-
ceived) purposes or goals (outside of those that are textually evident) is anti-
thetical to textualist methods. For textualists, the danger is too great that in at-
tempting to discern the legislature’s purpose and interpret statutes in 
accordance with it, the judge’s personal views of the ideal policy outcomes will 
ultimately prevail. Interpretation essentially takes place in one direction: the 
statutory text is to shape the outcome of applying it in a given case. Purposiv-
ists do not interpret rigidly in one direction.89 For purposivists, an outcome that 
is odd or counterintuitive in relation to a purpose the statute seems intended to 
serve may indicate that a judge has misconstrued the statute and should reex-
amine the text. Notably, this broad version of purposivism does not require an 
ambiguity finding, either ex ante or ex post. The consideration of outcome in 
light of purpose is viewed as a proper inquiry into meaning regardless of the 
existence of ambiguity.90 The absurdity doctrine echoes the two-direction fea-
                                                        
86  See generally HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 1374–78; see also JELLUM, supra note 21, 
at 38–42. 
87  Joseph Raz offered one conception of a more generalized legislative intent that depends 
not on the specific, subjective intentions of legislators, but rather is based on the assumption 
that the legislators broadly intended to enact the law as delineated by the statutory text. He 
essentially argued this minimal sort of intent is necessary in order to establish the authority 
of law. See Manning, supra note 15, at 2457 n.258. 
88  Many debates among statutory interpretation “camps” revolve around which approach 
best upholds the principle of legislative supremacy in the enterprise of making law. See, e.g., 
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91 
(2006). 
89  Molot, supra note 6, at 36–37 (arguing that “[t]extualists accuse purposivists of continu-
ing to look to context after they have arrived at a clear textual meaning,” but contending that 
this “alleged distinction . . . is not meaningful.”). 
90  By way of analogy using textualist terms, consider the textualist distinction between “de-
termining the ordinary meaning of the text” on the one hand and “resolving ambiguity” on 
the other: some tools of construction are appropriate at either or both phases, while others 
become permissible only if ambiguity is found ex ante and a judge must proceed to resolve 
it. One key difference between textualism and purposivism may be that purposivists do not 
draw this conceptual distinction, or at least find the distinction less significant in practice. 
Even for textualists, the nature and scope of these two stages is not especially well-
developed in the literature, and occasionally the two phases are conflated. However, there is 
ample support for the existence of a division given that the use of certain canons and other 
interpretive tools is consistently described as proper only to resolve ambiguous statues, while 
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ture of purposivist interpretation, effectively eliminating the distinction be-
tween clear versus ambiguous text by treating clear text as if it were ambigu-
ous. Thus, to the extent textualism relies on the absurdity doctrine as a fail-safe, 
it admits the superiority of an opposing interpretive approach.91 
The Supreme Court’s current conception of the absurdity doctrine shares 
little in common with Holy Trinity Church’s unabashed elevation of the spirit 
of the law over its text. As the Supreme Court’s interpretive jurisprudence in-
creasingly incorporated textualist principles, its willingness to invoke the ab-
surdity doctrine likewise decreased. In the absence of extreme circumstances, 
textualist-influenced courts cannot overtly invoke the modern absurdity doc-
trine either to avoid interpretations of unambiguous statutory text that seem in-
consistent with the statute’s broad purpose or goals, or to avoid applying a stat-
ute according to its clear terms where the result seems merely incongruous, 
unexpected, or just plain odd.92 
II. ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE: THE ROLE OF AMBIGUITY 
The increasing acceptance of textualist interpretive approaches has cur-
tailed the acceptable uses of the absurdity doctrine. Yet, regardless of what 
method of statutory interpretation judges employ, they are inevitably faced with 
the task of interpreting and applying statutory text to resolve actual disputes 
with significant legal and policy consequences. The implications of doing so 
cannot be entirely lost on judges, even for those who make every effort to re-
main apolitical and faithful to the judicial role. Whether a judge intentionally or 
unconsciously seeks to disguise a results-oriented interpretation, the results of 
particular interpretations have the potential to impact interpretive decisions. 
Given textualists’ frequent admonition that their theory is necessary in part be-
cause of the concern that judges will otherwise fail to restrain the impulse to 
interpret statutes to achieve a desired result, it would certainly be difficult for 
textualists to contend that this temptation does not exist. 
The confluence of this inevitable temptation and the restrictions of textual-
ist doctrine has created the somewhat perverse incentive for judges to conceal 
or obfuscate outcome-sensitive reasoning as the basis for judicial decisions. 
Less-accepted doctrines, such as broad versions of the absurdity doctrine, must 
                                                                                                                                
at the same time the determination of ordinary meaning is described as a process of contex-
tual analysis and may include sources of meaning such as dictionaries even where text is ul-
timately determined to be unambiguous. Unlike the old plain meaning rule, then, a statute’s 
meaning need not be immediately and automatically crystal clear in order to be unambigu-
ous. Thus, the potential for two separate inquiries to occur (i.e., an unsuccessful initial at-
tempt to determine the text’s ordinary meaning resulting in an ambiguity finding, followed 
by the resolution of the ambiguity) is implicit in textualist doctrine. 
91  See Jellum, supra note 11, at 938. 
92  And, because even modern purposivists purport to prioritize clear text, taking an explicit-
ly non-textualist approach is no longer a viable option either, short of significantly overhaul-
ing a significant amount of language in the Supreme Court’s interpretation jurisprudence 
emphasizing the primacy of statutory text. 
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be pursued under cover of more widely accepted interpretive doctrines. Here, 
then, is the root of absurdity in disguise. Whether consciously or not, judges 
have had to seize on less controversial rules of interpretation as vehicles for 
pursuing certain results in particular cases. Ambiguity fits the bill.93 
An ambiguity finding opens the door to a wealth of interpretive tools that 
would not be available without it. Crucially, all textualists—even strict textual-
ists—authorize the use of a much broader array of sources of meaning in cases 
where the text is found to be ambiguous.94 While “strict” textualists, like Jus-
tice Scalia, would continue to eschew legislative history even to resolve ambi-
guity, other textualists would permit its use.95 But other sources are permitted 
by even “pure” textualists. For instance, while Justice Scalia would not permit 
the use of headings and titles in statutes to override an apparently conflicting, 
but clear provision in the statutory text, he would permit the use of headings 
and titles to clarify ambiguous statutory text.96 Other examples abound, includ-
ing not only a variety of text-based canons, but also substantive canons like the 
constitutional avoidance canon97 and the rule of lenity.98 
                                                        
93  Even with modern textualists’ emphasis on ordinary meaning in context, instances still 
arise where either multiple reasonable possibilities exist as to meaning, or the meaning is 
simply not clear without further information. As noted, even modern textualists’ holistic, 
contextual prescriptions for the determination of ordinary meaning do not preclude ambigui-
ty findings in some instances. Thus, the question of ambiguity’s existence is uncontroversial. 
See Molot, supra note 6, at 35 (noting that “even the most committed textualists have openly 
acknowledged that text can be ambiguous . . .”). However, the frequency of ambiguity find-
ings by textualists versus purposivists has been criticized. See Merrill supra note 12, at 354 
(arguing that textualist judges are more likely than other judges to determine that statutes are 
unambiguous and that this tendency is excessive and problematic). 
94  See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (“If the text were clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted . . . But I agree 
with the Court that [it] is ambiguous . . . .”); see also JELLUM, supra note 21, at 28–29. 
95  See JELLUM, supra note 21, at 27–30. 
96  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 221–22. 
97  Professor Jellum describes the constitutional avoidance canon as another method, along 
with the absurdity doctrine, of avoiding the ordinary meaning of statutory text. JELLUM, su-
pra note 21, at 96–98. However, the avoidance doctrine was traditionally invoked as a way 
of resolving preexisting ambiguity. Id. at 96. Another scholar, Eric S. Fish, has contrasted 
the two conceptions and identified examples in recent caselaw. See Eric S. Fish, Constitu-
tional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1275–78 
(2016). He describes Jellum’s conception as a contemporary use of the avoidance doctrine 
that more closely resembles remedy, rather than an interpretive canon, and defends its use as 
a separate doctrine from the original canon. See id. at 1279–80. I contend that this “contem-
porary” avoidance is but one iteration of the broader phenomenon of absurdity in disguise. 
After all, that Congress might enact a law of questionable constitutionality is not narrowly 
absurd in the sense of being truly illogical or inconceivable—meaning that it cannot be 
overtly brought under the now-narrowed absurdity doctrine. Further, the proposition that 
Congress could not have intended to violate the constitution is not coterminous with the 
proposition that Congress could not have intended to enact the law that it did in the language 
that it used—and textualists, who reject considerations of the results of applying a statute, 
would be concerned only with the latter proposition even in absurdity cases. According to 
Justice Scalia-esque textualists, the proper inquiry would focus on whether it is absurd to 
imagine that Congress intended to enact the very language that it did. Yet, at the same time, 
19 NEV. L.J. 741, DOVE 5/27/2019  4:23 PM 
760 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:3  
An important point to emphasize is that ambiguity opens the door to addi-
tional sources of statutory meaning when the ambiguity finding is made ex ante 
(i.e., at the outset of the interpretive process). Traditionally, if an ambiguity 
finding is not made at the outset, sources beyond ordinary meaning cannot be 
consulted.99 “Many tenets of statutory interpretation take a peculiar form. They 
allow consideration of outside information—legislative history, practical con-
sequences, the statute’s title, etc.—but only if the statute’s text is unclear or 
ambiguous.”100 
In contrast, as described in the previous section, the absurdity doctrine es-
sentially allows a court to treat clear text as if it were ambiguous, opening the 
door to a broad array of interpretive tools that would otherwise not be available. 
When the absurdity doctrine is applied, a court may adopt a less natural reading 
of the statute that avoids the problematic results of applying the statute’s most 
obvious or ordinary meaning. This may involve narrowing or qualifying over-
broad terms in a statute, creating exceptions, extending the statute beyond its 
apparent reach, or adopting an uncommon or unusual usage as the definition of 
a statutory term (among other things). Whether statutory text is actually ambig-
uous or merely treated as such, the constraints of the plain meaning canon are 
removed: ipso facto, there is no plain meaning to apply. 
For textualists, ambiguity is less controversial than the absurdity doctrine 
for a variety of reasons. Perhaps most significantly, ambiguity is viewed as a 
purely linguistic phenomenon rather than as a question of policy preference. 
Ambiguity can even be differentiated from textual canons of interpretation like 
the rule against surplusage, which instructs that wherever possible statutes 
                                                                                                                                
it would certainly strike many as more than odd to imagine that Congress intended to enact 
an unconstitutional law. This tension reflects the continuum of definitions of absurdity—an 
unconstitutional ordinary meaning is appropriately conceptualized as one type of absurdity 
falling below the threshold necessary to fall within the modern absurdity doctrine’s narrow 
reach. 
98  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 296–302. 
99  For instance, see the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc.: 
The proponents of the alternative view of § 1367 insist that the statute is at least ambiguous and 
that we should look to other interpretive tools, including the legislative history of § 1367, which 
supposedly demonstrate Congress did not intend § 1367 to overrule Zahn. We can reject this ar-
gument at the very outset simply because § 1367 is not ambiguous. 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567 (2005). The implication 
here is that without the ambiguity finding in advance, it would be inappropriate to consider 
legislative history. Whatever might be found in the legislative history cannot be permitted to 
impact the interpretation of clear text. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 
50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (“If the text in this case were 
clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted. But I agree with the Court that [it] is 
ambiguous . . . .”); JELLUM, supra note 21, at 28. 
100  William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 539, 540 (2017). 
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should be interpreted to avoid rendering a provision inoperative.101 Whereas the 
latter doctrine is justified by the claim that it reflects typical usage conventions 
employed by average speakers (here, avoiding redundancy), ambiguity effec-
tively justifies the need to resolve it by its very existence. Any problem with 
the clarity of statutory language must necessarily be resolved as a part of the 
process of interpretation. Otherwise, by definition, there is no meaning—plain, 
ordinary, or in any other sense—to apply. Whatever controversy exists over 
what interpretation properly entails, resolving ambiguity is indisputably a nec-
essary component. 
This insight, although self-evident, is actually quite significant. Ambiguity 
is invariably, and for the most part uncontrovertibly, viewed as interpretation 
in a positive sense. In other words, even the use of textual canons that purport 
to reflect typical usage conventions is normative in the sense that to employ 
them as some textualists do is to assert, inter alia, (1) that the ordinary meaning 
of text based on general usage constitutes the meaning of the text in the sense 
that is relevant for statutory interpretation, (2) that the textual canons accurately 
reflect usage conventions in the relevant linguistic community (or that they do 
so frequently enough to be useful), and so on.102 Ambiguity is least associated 
with judicial “construction”—the view of some scholars of interpretation that a 
separate process beyond interpretation exists in which judges must venture be-
yond linguistic analysis in order to give meaning to statutory text.103 The con-
cept, and even the existence, of a separate step of statutory “construction” has 
been hotly debated, likely because it suggests a degree of judicial lawmak-
ing.104 Interpretation, on the other hand, is more broadly viewed as fully within 
the proper judicial role. Thus, ambiguity fits most comfortably within the lim-
ited scope of judicial decision-making that textualist judges espouse and with 
which judges in general are likely most comfortable. 
                                                        
101  See Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017) (explain-
ing that the surplusage canon presumes “that each word Congress uses is there for a rea-
son.”). These canons, too, are closely related to ambiguity in that they may be employed to 
resolve ambiguous statutory text. In fact, authority can be found for the proposition that can-
ons such as these are only to be utilized once statutory text has been found to be ambiguous. 
On the other hand, these canons are sometimes used without an explicit (and sometimes even 
without an implicit) finding of ambiguity; instead, it appears as though they are being em-
ployed as part of the determination of the ordinary meaning of text. Given that ordinary 
meaning is largely by the ordinary use of terms found in statutes, the latter approach makes 
some sense for linguistic canons such as those mentioned here. 
102  Even proponents of the canons’ use acknowledge that they will conflict in some instanc-
es, necessitating a normative judgment as to which should be employed. Cf. SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 2, at 33 (indicating how some canons only apply to ambiguous terms 
and others to vague terms). 
103  See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010). 
104  See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
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Further, because ambiguity is viewed as a problem inherent in the text it-
self,105 the source of the problem is the unclear or inadequate expression by the 
legislature which drafted the text. Placing the source of the problem squarely 
on the legislature’s expression contributes to the perception of ambiguity as 
solely a textual, as opposed to “substantive” doctrine. Unlike the absurdity doc-
trine, the justification for employing tools to resolve ambiguity is non-
consequentialist.106 Here, perhaps, is one of the key distinctions between ambi-
guity and absurdity (and a key explanation for why the former canon is far less 
controversial): to invoke the absurdity doctrine, a judge must consider the result 
of applying clear statutory text and determine that this result is a problem. The 
problem arises during the fundamentally judicial process of interpreting statutes 
and applying them in specific cases. In cases involving ambiguity, judges can 
argue that they cannot even begin to engage in this judicial process without first 
resolving the problem of unclear drafting, which arose as part of the legislative 
process. It is far easier to avoid the charge that judges inject their own policy 
preferences into the interpretive process when the problem at issue is viewed as 
one originating outside the judicial process, but simultaneously squarely within 
the judicial role to resolve. 
The perception of ambiguity as solely a function of language, and not de-
pendent on legislative policy choices107 or judicial policy preferences, lends 
courts’ efforts to resolve it an air of objectivity that contributes significantly to 
its broad acceptance within the judicial role. On the one hand, it would be diffi-
cult to imagine a scholar of linguistics contending that the determination of 
meaning is a simple, purely objective affair. Linguistics, like any scholarly 
field, is rife with controversy over a number of questions involving the mean-
ing of language.108 That said, the conventional (or “lay”) use of linguistic ter-
                                                        
105  The thesis of this paper is that in many situations where ambiguity is found, it is actually 
“created” by the problematic result of applying text that is, in actuality, clear. I also note lat-
er in this section that the conflation of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness frequently 
results in ambiguity findings where true ambiguity is not present. The proposition here is 
thus intended to express a common perception of ambiguity that contributes to its broad ac-
ceptance and “reputation” for objectivity; I do not assert this as a fact about ambiguity find-
ings in practice. 
106  Of course, any interpretive method or tool is consequentialist in the sense that the inter-
pretive enterprise as a whole seeks to determine the meaning of statutory text. However, am-
biguity need not (but, of course, may) be resolved with an eye toward the outcome of the 
decision. In contrast, the absurdity doctrine is implicated solely because of an undesirable 
outcome and applied with the explicit goal of avoiding that outcome in favor of a preferred 
one. 
107  True ambiguity is almost always the result of carelessness or inattention. It is rarely intention-
al—though there are certainly instances of statutory or contractual ambiguity in which each side, 
fully aware of the ambiguity, embraces it in the hope or belief that its version of meaning will 
ultimately prevail. 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 32. 
108  See, e.g., LAURIE BAUER, BEGINNING LINGUISTICS 11–12 (2012). As one simple example, 
the word “happen” has two meanings: “Did you happen to see the accident happen?” Id. at 
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minology such as “semantics” suggests a technical, literal meaning. While 
many prominent textualists, for instance, reject the characterization of their ap-
proach as overly literal (or semantic in its most negative, lay connotation), they 
do benefit in a way from this perception because it suggests a relatively objec-
tive, almost scientific approach to the determination of statutory meaning. 
Moreover, typical examples of linguistic ambiguity given in the statutory 
interpretation context include simple examples based on homonymous words 
whose meanings are easily resolved within proper context.109 This may give the 
(likely misleading) impression that resolving ambiguity is simply a matter of 
examining the context of a term to determine the sense in which it is used. 
While most textualists would likely agree that, in practice, ambiguity is not 
necessarily so simplistic, the frequent use of simple examples to illustrate the 
concept is another factor that contributes to the perception that ambiguity is 
purely a matter of linguistics or language—implying its existence is unrelated 
to policy judgments or outcome considerations.110 
Another explanation for the appeal of ambiguity is its malleability. The 
problem of defining statutory ambiguity has been widely addressed in the liter-
ature.111 As a number of scholars have noted, ambiguity could refer only to sit-
uations where statutory text suggests two (or more) “equally plausible” mean-
ings.112 This would be a more significant hurdle for an ambiguity finding than, 
for instance, a standard providing that a statute is ambiguous if reasonable peo-
ple could disagree as to its meaning.113 A very broad definition of ambiguity 
could provide that a statute is ambiguous if it has two or more possible mean-
ings.114 And, of course, courts may determine a statute is ambiguous without 
explicitly offering a definition of ambiguity. Moreover, the difficulty of draw-
ing the line between clear and ambiguous text is not confined to one interpre-
                                                                                                                                
13. Linguists debate whether “happen” is one word with two meanings, exhibiting the quali-
ty of polysemy, or two words that are homonyms. See id. at 14. 
109  Take, for instance, the common example of “bay,” which could mean a horse or a geo-
graphic feature depending on the context. See Bay, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bay [https://perma.cc/68TS-DC6K] (last visit-
ed Jan. 21, 2019). 
110  The thesis of this paper is that ambiguity, in practice, has been found to exist as a result 
of policy preferences or considerations regarding the outcome of applying apparently clear 
statutory language. The proposition here is simply that the common perception of ambiguity 
is that it is not the result of such preferences, and is purely a linguistic phenomenon. 
111  See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 
2134–40 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)); Lawrence 
M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859 (2004) 
(“[T]he concept of ambiguity is itself perniciously ambiguous. People do not always use the 
term in the same way, and the differences often appear to go unnoticed.”). 
112  See, e.g., JELLUM, supra note 21, at 88 (quoting LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID C. HRICIK, 
MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 
94 (2d ed. 2009)). 
113  See id. 
114  See id. at 87. 
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tive approach and does not appear to impact judicial decision-making within 
interpretive approaches in a consistent way.115 
Further, ambiguity is amenable to the exercise of judicial discretion be-
cause of its frequent conflation with the related concepts of vagueness. While 
legal scholars and philosophers of language regularly distinguish the concepts 
of ambiguity and vagueness, this line is not commonly drawn in judicial opin-
ions.116 While ambiguity refers to a situation where language is subject to vary-
ing interpretations because it can be understood in two or more different senses, 
vagueness occurs where the scope or extent of what a term refers to is unclear 
or indeterminate.117 While an ambiguous term could arguably denote two com-
pletely different things—“bay” as a horse or as a water feature—a vague term 
typically denotes similar things, but to an unclear extent.118 Thus, in Hart’s 
classic problem of the prohibition of vehicles in the park, the term vehicles may 
or may not include bicycles, skateboards, or strollers.119 This factor may be one 
of the most significant in terms of explaining the phenomenon of ambiguity in 
disguise: the ability to invoke policy to narrow statutory text or to create excep-
tions without invoking the criticism of judicial overreach is bolstered by the 
conflation of vagueness with the linguistic concept of ambiguity. 
Before turning to the cases that I view as exhibiting absurdity in disguise, a 
further word on the relationship between the absurdity doctrine and purposiv-
ism is in order. Professor Richard M. Re previously identified the connection 
between Holy Trinity Church and three of the cases discussed below120: King v. 
Burwell,121 Bond v. United States,122 and Yates v. United States.123 His article 
characterizes the Supreme Court’s interpretive approach in these cases, which 
he calls “the New Holy Trinity,” as an outright rejection of Justice Scalia’s ver-
                                                        
115  See Merrill, supra note 84, at 1091; Molot, supra note 6, at 40–41. Professor Molot has 
argued that in attempting to distinguish themselves from purposivists, textualists have over-
emphasized the line between clarity and ambiguity both by being overly willing to conclude 
that their methods can “eliminate” ambiguity and by making the implications of an ambigui-
ty finding too weighty. Id. at 50–51. The manipulation of the line between clarity and ambi-
guity, he contends, gives textualist judges ample leeway in interpretation, aggravating the 
problem of the improper exercise of judicial discretion that textualists seek to curtail. See id. 
at 50. To the extent textualism played a role in elevating the significance of ambiguity find-
ings, its success was instrumental in creating the incentives resulting in absurdity in disguise. 
116  JELLUM, supra note 21, at 89. 
117  Id. at 87–89. 
118  See id. 
119  For an in-depth discussion of Hart’s problem from a textualist perspective, see SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 2, at 36–38. 
120  See generally Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 407, 407–17 
(2015), http://www.greenbag.org/v18n4/v18n4_articles_re.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJA6-K4H 
C]. 
121  See id. at 413–15. 
122  See id. at 409–11. 
123  See id. at 411–13. 
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sion of strong textualism.124 Professor Re contends that in these cases the Su-
preme Court has “repeatedly and visibly embraced” a more purposive, prag-
matic approach.125 
In contrast, this article views the ongoing interpretive shift as resulting 
from textualism’s success and entrenchment. As illustrated throughout the cas-
es described in Part III below, the Supreme Court opinions identified here and 
by Professor Re (in addition to two decisions unique to this article) are rife with 
textualist terminology, principles, and precedent. When statutory purpose is 
considered, it is frequently (though not exclusively) through the lens of statuto-
ry context or the statutory scheme. Separation of powers and the proper role of 
the judiciary are invoked as paramount concerns.126 The realities (and even va-
garies) of the legislative process are repeatedly referenced. And, most signifi-
cantly, ambiguity findings are central to the Court’s holdings. This more close-
ly resembles lip service to, as opposed to outright abandonment of textualism: 
rather than overtly disregard clear text, the text is instead labeled “ambiguous.” 
A 2006 article by Professor Jonathan T. Molot may further illuminate the 
distinction. Professor Molot argued that modern textualism is doomed to either 
irrelevancy or normative unattractiveness because of the lack of meaningful 
remaining distinctions between its approach and that of purpovisism.127 Signifi-
cantly, he noted that textualists criticize purposivists for “continuing to look to 
context after they have arrived at a clear textual meaning and of using their on-
going contextual inquiry to adjust or even contradict the clear textual meaning,” 
whereas textualists “purport to use extratextual factors only before arriving at a 
statute’s clear meaning, and never to contradict that clear meaning.”128 He ar-
gued that these approaches no longer differed importantly in effect and that the 
differences in methodology were fairly insignificant, primarily as a result of 
modern textualists’ attention to context in the determination of meaning.129 
Crucially, consider Professor Molot’s example of a Supreme Court decision 
exhibiting the irrelevance of the differing approaches in terms of the outcome. 
In the same case, a concurring opinion of Justice Thomas noted, “If the text 
were clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted. But I agree with the 
Court that [it] is ambiguous, rather than unambiguous as Justice Stevens con-
                                                        
124  See Re, supra note 120, at 407 (noting that “purposivism seems to have evolved and, as a 
result, to have gotten the upper hand”). 
125  Id. at 408. Earlier works by other scholars predicted similar outcomes, warning that “ag-
gressive” textualists would doom their approach if they insisted on doctrinal rigidity and 
failed to acknowledge common ground already forged with purposivists. See, e.g., Molot, 
supra note 6, at 48. Professor Jonathan R. Siegel went further, contending that the core ten-
ets of textualism could not be moderated and remain internally consistent; thus, textualism 
would necessarily, rather than contingently fail as a viable interpretive approach. See Siegel, 
supra note 5, at 169. 
126  This is not to imply, of course, that only textualists prioritize these concerns. 
127  See Molot, supra note 6, at 2. 
128  Id. at 4, 37. 
129  See id. at 35–36. 
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tends.”130 While Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence, “If an unambiguous 
text describing a plausible policy decision were a sufficient basis for determin-
ing the meaning of a statute, we would have to affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. . . . We can, however, escape [‘this unambiguous statutory com-
mand’] by using common sense.”131 
This insight is particularly telling in light of Professor Re’s “New Holy 
Trinity” and absurdity in disguise. Professor Molot may be correct that these 
approaches do not differ significantly in practice, but the root cause of absurdi-
ty in disguise is courts’ unwillingness to adopt an overtly purposive approach. 
Instead, judges purport to adhere to textualist principles and methodology; they 
employ purposive considerations under the guise of ambiguity rather than 
openly embrace them as illuminating or modifying otherwise clear text. The 
obfuscation created by this evasion may entail more significant consequences 
for methodology and for outcomes. And the incentive to obfuscate explains the 
utility of absurdity in disguise—a form of reverse-ambiguity via purposivism’s 
close cousin, the absurdity doctrine.132 
Again, despite the complications outlined above, the determination and 
resolution of statutory ambiguity is a broadly accepted part of the judicial role, 
grounded squarely within the process of interpretation (and thus mostly im-
mune from charges of constituting judicial “construction” or lawmaking). The 
question, then, is how the relatively uncontroversial ambiguity doctrine can be 
used to conceal the application of other canons like the absurdity doctrine. A 
number of cases examined in the following section illustrate how this occurs in 
practice. 
The tension between textualism and the absurdity doctrine has manifested 
itself in decisions at all levels of the federal courts through what I have referred 
to as “absurdity in disguise.” In order to achieve what appears to them to be 
sensible or correct results, judges have begun to employ findings of ambiguity 
to open the door to deeper judicial inquiry. This enables judges to portray their 
reasoning as falling squarely within the interpretive, rather than constructive 
(note—in the undesirable sense, not construing) realm. And, unlike construc-
tion, interpretation is seen by textualists as an entirely appropriate part of the 
judicial enterprise within the constitutional framework of separation of powers. 
Thus, judges maintain an aura of objectivity while being permitted to consider 
the results of various applications of the statutory text. 
                                                        
130  Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring)); see also Molot, supra note 6, at 38 n.160. 
131  Molot, supra note 6, at 38 n.160 (quoting Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 543 U.S. at 
65 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
132  See Re, supra note 120, at 418; see also Manning, supra note 15, at 2400 (noting that the 
Supreme Court “has traditionally defended the absurdity doctrine as a version of strong in-
tentionalism”). 
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The following sections demonstrate the phenomenon in the decisions of 
several courts confronting contested language in three widely different statuto-
ry regimes. 
III. ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE IN PRACTICE: EXAMPLES FROM RECENT CASES 
Spanning diverse matters at all levels of the federal courts, the cases below 
share striking commonalities. In all of them, apparently clear text was treated 
as ambiguous in order to avoid arguably unusual, unreasonable, or unconstitu-
tional results—exactly the analysis that would be employed had the absurdity 
doctrine been invoked explicitly. The odd or undesirable results of applying the 
apparently clear text created doubt that the statutes at issue could actually mean 
what they appear to say. The courts mask this reasoning somewhat by arguing 
that ambiguity “derived from” or was “created by” the consequences of apply-
ing the apparent meanings—the implication being that the ambiguity was 
preexisting, or at least linguistically present.133 But under the traditional, lin-
guistic conception, ambiguity does not exist merely because multiple meanings 
could possibly be attributed to the text upon further reflection on the conse-
quences. Rather, ambiguity is a textually facial, ex ante phenomenon. Multiple 
meanings are fairly possible because of the existence of ambiguity; ambiguity 
does not exist because of the desirability or practicability of one meaning over 
another. The absurdity doctrine, which imposes ambiguity ex post, in light of 
the perceived consequences of applying statutory text, is distinguishable from 
traditional ambiguity for precisely that reason. This is implied in common de-
scriptions of the absurdity doctrine as permitting a judge to “look beyond” clear 
text or to “treat” clear text as if it were ambiguous. 
A. Bond v. United States 
Carol Ann Bond, a microbiologist, discovered that her husband was the fa-
ther of her best friend’s child.134 Seeking revenge, she stole an arsenic-based 
chemical compound from her employer and obtained another chemical used to 
print photographs and clean laboratory equipment, the latter available on Ama-
                                                        
133  It is important here to distinguish absurdity in disguise from Supreme Court precedent 
holding that apparently clear statutory text may actually be found ambiguous when placed in 
context. The Court has ruled that the “meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases 
may only become evident when placed in context” and “with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.” Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000). In a sense, ambiguity is also “created” in these instances. 
However, the primary distinction is that the context and statutory scheme that give meaning 
to (or illuminate the ambiguity of) a statutory term are textual sources. In contrast, the crea-
tion of ambiguity through the application of the absurdity doctrine occurs in light of the con-
sequences of a statute’s application. Notably, Justice Scalia joined in the majority opinion in 
Brown & Williamson. See id. at 124. 
134  Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 852 (2014). 
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zon.com.135 In high enough doses, both chemicals are potentially lethal.136 At 
least twenty-four times, Bond dabbed small amounts of two chemicals on her 
former best friend’s mailbox, car door, and door knob.137 Bond maintained that 
she did not intend to kill Myrlinda Haynes, the intended victim, but rather in-
tended to cause her to suffer an uncomfortable rash.138 Her efforts largely 
failed; Haynes noticed the presence of the chemicals and avoided them almost 
entirely.139 She did come into contact with a chemical once and received a mi-
nor thumb burn, which apparently needed no treatment other than rinsing with 
water.140 
Bond was eventually discovered and charged with mail theft after the post 
office observed her stealing an envelope from Haynes’ mail and putting chemi-
cals on Haynes’ car.141 However, she was also charged with possession and use 
of a chemical weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229(a), a provision of the 
Chemical Weapons Implementation Act (“the Act”).142 Congress passed the 
Act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction 
(“the Convention”), a 1997 treaty intended to expand the Geneva Convention’s 
prohibitions of the use of chemical weapons.143 The treaty was the result of 
concerns over the continued use of chemical weapons, including mustard gas 
and nerve agents, during and outside of wartime up until the 1990s.144 
In federal district court, Bond argued that the chemical weapons charge 
should be dismissed because the Act was outside the scope of Congress’ power 
and intruded on traditional state authority in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment.145 After the court denied her motion, she pleaded guilty but reserved her 
right to appeal.146 On appeal, the Third Circuit initially ruled she lacked stand-
ing to challenge the Act, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision.147 When 
the case was remanded, Bond argued that the Act was intended to prohibit the 
use of chemical weapons for “warlike” activities, as evidenced by an exception 
to the Act that permitted the use of chemical weapons for “peaceful purpos-
                                                        
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 848–49. The Geneva Protocol’s prohibition of chemical weapons extended to state 
actors during times of war; the Convention broadened this prohibition “to exclude complete-
ly the possibility of the use of chemical weapons . . .” Id. at 849. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. at 852–53. 
146  Id. at 853. 
147  Id. 
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es.”148 While Bond conceded that her use of chemicals was wrongful, she con-
tended it was not the type of act that the Convention and Act were enacted to 
prevent.149 The Third Circuit disagreed, ruling that Bond’s activities certainly 
could not be considered “peaceful” and were thus outside the exception to the 
Act.150 While the Third Circuit noted that the Act was extremely broad, it nev-
ertheless ruled that it was within Congress’ authority because the Convention 
was valid; thus, a statute enacted to implement it in accordance with the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause is also valid.151 The Supreme Court again granted certi-
orari.152 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the majority began with a discussion of 
federalism and enumerated powers, but noted quickly the well-settled principle 
that these constitutional questions should be avoided if at all possible.153 Be-
cause Bond had raised the argument that the Act did not even cover her con-
duct, the Court chose to address the statutory interpretation question first.154 
The Act provides that no one shall knowingly “develop, produce, otherwise 
acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, 
or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”155 In a definitional section, 
“chemical weapon” is defined as “[a] toxic chemical and its precursors, except 
where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the 
type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose.”156 “Toxic chemical” is de-
fined as: 
[A]ny chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can 
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin 
or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are pro-
duced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.157 
Finally, as noted above, the Act excepts from the prohibition the use of such 
chemicals for peaceful purposes, including “industrial, agricultural, research, 
medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity . . .”158 
The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the Act clearly encom-
passed Bond’s conduct. Drawing on a number of examples of “background 
principles of construction,” the Court concluded that the statute must be read in 
light of its context and purpose and consistent with constitutional principles and 
                                                        
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. at 853–85. 
152  Id. at 854. 
153  Id. at 854–55. 
154  Id. at 855. 
155  Id. at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1)). 
156  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A)). 
157  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A)). 
158  Id. (interal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(7)). 
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limitations.159 Particularly where the balance of power between the federal 
government and the states is concerned, the Court has been reluctant to con-
strue federal statutes in a way that would intrude on areas of “traditional state 
responsibility.”160 Citing several cases in which the Court had narrowed the 
reach of federal statutes on this basis, the Court concluded: 
These precedents make clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic prin-
ciples of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in 
a federal statute. In this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably 
broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term—“chemical 
weapon”—being defined; the deeply serious consequences of adopting 
such a boundless reading; and the lack of any apparent need to do so in 
light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemi-
cal warfare and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious case, we can 
insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local 
crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that 
intrudes on the police power of the States.161 
As other scholars have noted, this reasoning turns that traditional constitu-
tional avoidance canon on its head.162 Rather than apply it only after the court 
finds a statute is ambiguous in order to select among possible interpretations, 
the canon is employed here in a way that creates ambiguity from apparently 
clear text.163 Notably, the Court addressed Justice Scalia’s objection in his con-
curring opinion that the cases cited by the majority in support of its holding 
were inapposite because they dealt with statutes that were unclear at the outset: 
“We agree; we simply think the statute in this case is also subject to construc-
tion, for the reasons given.”164 Thus, while concluding that the avoidance prin-
ciples underlying the previous cases were applicable in Bond, the Court seem-
ingly acknowledged that the source of ambiguity in the instant case differed 
from the precedent cited. 
In concluding the opinion, the Court noted that its disagreement with the 
dissenting justices “reduces to whether [the Act] is ‘utterly clear.’ ”165 
We think it is not, given that the definition of ‘chemical weapon’ in a 
particular case can reach beyond any normal notion of such a weapon, 
that the context from which the statute arose demonstrates a much more 
limited prohibition was intended, and that the most sweeping reading of 
the statute would fundamentally upset the Constitution’s balance be-
tween national and local power. This exceptional convergence of factors 
                                                        
159  Id. at 857–860. 
160  Id. at 858. 
161  Id. at 859–60. 
162  See generally Fish, supra note 97. 
163  See id. at 1275. 
164  Bond, 872 U.S. at 860 n.2 (emphasis added). 
165  Id. at 865. 
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gives us serious reason to doubt the Government’s expansive reading of 
[the Act], and calls for us to interpret the statute more narrowly.166 
Perhaps most revealingly, the Court called the case “unusual,” and cau-
tioned, “our analysis is appropriately limited.”167 These qualifications are high-
ly suggestive of the conflicts underlying absurdity in disguise. It would be dif-
ficult in any case for a judge to ignore entirely the consequences of applying 
such sweepingly broad text as it is written where the options are effectively ei-
ther to rewrite federalism or strike the provision as unconstitutional. But per-
haps even more important is the difficulty of ignoring these consequences in a 
case with facts that seem unlike any Congress would have contemplated when 
drafting the statute. Without the absurdity doctrine as a fail-safe, and with the 
Court’s textualist precedent requiring commitment to statutory text, the only 
escape from the text was through a finding of ambiguity. 
Bond also exploited one of the key characteristics of ambiguity that makes 
it an effective disguise for the use of the absurdity doctrine. Bond dealt with an 
extremely broad statute that plainly, but oddly, encompassed conduct that 
seemed outside the scope of what Congress must have intended to reach. Even 
though questions of scope are more properly considered problems of vagueness 
(if anything), the Court classified the statute’s problem as one of ambiguity. 
Although the majority acknowledged in a footnote that it was engaging in 
“construction” of the statute, its decision to ground its decision in ambiguity 
perhaps belied its unwillingness to overtly subvert clear meaning. Acknowledg-
ing that the statute was vague would have made the Court’s use of the absurdity 
doctrine far more transparent—after all, the infamous Holy Trinity Church168 
opinion openly narrowed the scope of a broad statutory term. Even Justice 
Scalia has endorsed the narrow use of the absurdity doctrine as a method of 
correcting overly broad statutory terms.169 
Finally, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion is illuminating. He expressed 
bewilderment over the analysis employed by the majority in reaching its con-
clusion. He found the statute’s meaning to be “plain” and its application to 
Bond’s case “hardly complicated.”170 He blamed the majority’s conclusion that 
the statute was ambiguous on “result-driven antitextualism,” noting that it in-
verted the avoidance canon to hold that potentially unconstitutional effects of 
applying a statute’s plain meaning can render the text ambiguous.171 “Imagine 
what future courts can do with that judge-empowering principle: Whatever has 
improbably broad, deeply serious, and apparently unnecessary consequences 
. . . is ambiguous!”172 Justice Scalia agreed that the statute was likely unconsti-
                                                        
166  Id. at 866. 
167  Id. at 865. 
168  Holy Trinity Church v. United States,143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892). 
169  See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
170  Bond, 572 U.S. at 567–68 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
171  See id. at 868. 
172  Id. at 870. 
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tutional due to its breadth, but would not have permitted that result to impact 
the interpretation.173 
Although the late Justice accused the majority of “anti-textualism,” his 
frustration may better be explained in light of absurdity in disguise. The majori-
ty’s opinion did not flatly reject textualism—on the contrary, the majority de-
scribed its analysis using Justice Scalia’s “fair reading” label; took great care to 
couch its analysis in terms of context, shared understandings, and the back-
ground norms of legislating; and invoked ambiguity as a justification for con-
sidering broader statutory purposes. Perhaps Justice Scalia’s ire came from his 
perception that his beloved doctrine was overtly invoked, yet turned on its 
head—largely as a result of its own successes. 
B. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(“DFA”), a Congressional response to the financial crisis of 2008, provides en-
hanced protections for whistleblowers who report an employer’s violation of 
various securities or other federal laws.174 Although the general trend of the 
DFA expands on the whistleblower protections authorized by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),175 the opposite appears to result under the DFA’s 
anti-retaliation provisions, which protect whistleblowers from adverse action 
by employers as a result of specified protected activity.176 Under SOX, em-
ployers are prohibited from retaliating against whistleblowers who either report 
violations internally to the company (i.e., “inside whistleblowers”),177 or who 
report violations externally to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
                                                        
173  See id. at 872. 
174  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012); see also Asadi v. G.E. (USA) Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 
620, 622–23 (5th Cir. 2013). 
175  See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s An-
tiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 729 (2014) (describ-
ing how the DFA’s whistleblower provisions “significantly expand upon” those of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 by, for example, greatly extending the statute of limitations for 
suits brought to enforce whistleblower protections). 
176  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). 
177  Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, an organization that is convicted of a 
crime receives more leniency at sentencing if it had an effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram in place. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(f)(1) (U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n 2015) (establishing the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program as 
a mitigating factor at sentencing); id. § 8B2.1 (defining an effective compliance and ethics 
program, including the requirement that such program be “reasonably designed, implement-
ed, and enforced so that the program is generally effective in preventing and detecting crimi-
nal conduct” but noting that the failure of a program need not mean it is not “generally effec-
tive”). The Guidelines provide that an effective compliance and ethics program requires an 
organization to “take reasonable steps . . . to have and publicize a system . . . whereby the 
organization’s employees and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or ac-
tual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.” Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5). Thus, the Guidelines 
incentivize organizations to encourage inside whistleblowing. 
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(“SEC”) (“outside whistleblowers”).178 However, the DFA defines a “whistle-
blower” as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting joint-
ly who provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission [the SEC], in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
[SEC].”179 The inclusion of “to the Commission” limits the definition to outside 
whistleblowers, excluding inside whistleblowers who report violations to their 
employers. 
Further, DFA’s anti-retaliation protections expressly cover only “whistle-
blowers”: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly 
or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblow-
er in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act 
done by the whistleblower— 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this 
section; 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial 
or administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to 
such information; or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under [speci-
fied federal laws], and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.180 
Thus, on its face, the statute appears to exclude whistleblowers who fail to re-
port securities violations directly to the SEC from the ambit of the DFA’s anti-
retaliation protections. Nevertheless, the SEC issued a rule pursuant to its regu-
latory authority under the statute providing that the “whistleblowers” protected 
under the anti-retaliation provisions include both inside and outside whistle-
blowers.181 The SEC relied on the third prong of the DFA’s anti-retaliation pro-
tections, which protect disclosures “required or protected under” numerous fed-
eral laws, including SOX.182 Because SOX protects both internal and external 
whistleblowers, the SEC reasoned that internal whistleblowers were covered 
under the third prong of DFA’s anti-retaliation provisions, despite not being in-
cluded in the DFA’s definition of whistleblower.183 
Two federal circuit courts and numerous district courts have addressed this 
issue. Most of the district courts have ruled that the DFA does protect inside 
                                                        
178  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2012); see also Pacella, supra note 175, at 732 
(noting that “§ 806 of SOX clearly protects both internal and external whistleblowers”). 
179  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (emphasis added). 
180  Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
181  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b) (2019), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 
620 (5th Cir. 2013) (“For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by [15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(h)(1)], you are a whistleblower if . . . [y]ou provide . . . information in a manner de-
scribed in [15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)].”). 
182  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b). 
183  See Pacella, supra note 175, at 730–33 for a detailed summary of the SEC’s process in 
enacting the rule. 
19 NEV. L.J. 741, DOVE 5/27/2019  4:23 PM 
774 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:3  
whistleblowers.184 Notably, the Fifth and Second Circuits have reached oppo-
site conclusions on the issue. Below, I contrast the opinions of the Fifth and 
Second Circuits, which offer a remarkable illustration of absurdity in disguise 
and textualism’s role in its existence. 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision, Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC,185 offers a 
classic textualist analysis of the statute. Early in the court’s analysis, it empha-
sized the preeminence of statutory text: “When faced with questions of statuto-
ry construction, ‘we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and 
unambiguous’ and, ‘[i]f it is, we must apply the statute according to its 
terms.’ ”186 “If the statutory text is unambiguous, our inquiry begins and ends 
with the text.”187 Turning to the definition section, the court concluded that the 
DFA’s definition of “whistleblower,” at least “standing alone,” clearly applied 
only to whistleblowers who report violations to the SEC.188 
The court rejected the holdings of several district courts who found either 
that the statutory scheme was ambiguous or conflicting189 because of the ten-
                                                        
184  For a more complete list of citations to district court decisions on the issue, see Berman 
v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2015). 
185  Asadi v. G.E. Energy, LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
186  Id. at 622 (alteration in original) (quoting Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)). 
187  Id. (citing BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)). 
188  See id. at 623. 
189  See id. at 624–25, 624 n.6. In an interesting (though unreported) decision, a district court 
found that the DFA’s whistleblower provision and anti-retaliation provisions contradicted 
one another, but noted that the plaintiff’s argument that Congress intended the definition to 
include inside whistleblowers would read the phrase “to the Commission” out of the defini-
tion entirely, rendering the phrase surplusage. See Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 
8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). In light of this, the court 
resolved the conflict by treating the third prong of the anti-retaliation provision as a “narrow 
exception” to the DFA’s whistleblower definition, thus protecting only those inside whistle-
blowers whose disclosures fall under the third prong (finding that the third prong creates a 
broader definition of “whistleblowers” than is applicable under the rest of the statutory 
scheme). See id. at *5. Notably, the court began this analysis by noting its duty to first “de-
termine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to 
the particular dispute in the case.” Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). For similar analyses citing Egan, 
see Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013) (noting that the “plain 
language” of the DFA encompasses only outside whistleblowers, but following Egan’s “nar-
row exception” holding because the DFA’s whistleblower definition “is in direct conflict” 
with its anti-retaliation provisions); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 
986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). Other district courts adopting the “narrow exception” charac-
terization more explicitly viewed the issue as one of ambiguity: “I do not believe it is unam-
biguously clear that the Dodd-Frank Act’s retaliation provision only applies to [outside whis-
tleblowers].” See Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4 
(D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); see also Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No: 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 
WL 2190084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (deferring to the SEC’s interpretation of the 
DFA after finding statutory ambiguity “aris[ing] from the tension between” the definition 
and the anti-retaliation provisions). The Murray court found that both the “narrow excep-
tion” interpretation and an interpretation limiting anti-retaliation protections solely to outside 
whistleblowers were both “competing, plausible interpretations”; thus, the text “is ambigu-
ous in conveying Congress’s intent.” Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
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sion between the DFA’s definition section and its anti-retaliation provisions.190 
The court distinguished between the definition’s classification of protected per-
sons from the anti-retaliation provision’s classification of protected activi-
ties.191 A conflict would only arise, the court reasoned, if both sections of the 
DFA were read as definition sections.192 The court bolstered this conclusion by 
noting that interpreting the DFA to cover inside whistleblowers would render 
the clause “to the [SEC]” in its definition section superfluous.193 Moreover, 
bringing inside whistleblowers under the purview of the DFA through the third 
prong of the anti-retaliation provision would arguably render SOX’s anti-
retaliation protections largely superfluous, as well, at least in the sense that eve-
ry SOX anti-retaliation claim could be brought instead under the DFA.194 
Throughout the Fifth Circuit’s decision, it frequently referred to plain 
meaning and unambiguous text in support of its decision that some have argued 
flies in the face of the DFA’s clear intent to enlarge the whistleblower protec-
tions under SOX.195 The Second Circuit, which examined the issue in Berman 
v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,196 took a vastly different approach. The court’s introduc-
tory sentences immediately highlighted the apparent “tension” in the DFA’s 
whistleblower protection provisions and concluded that “the pertinent provi-
sions of Dodd-Frank create a sufficient ambiguity to warrant our deference to 
the SEC’s interpretive rule . . .”197 And after describing the background of the 
case and the statutory scheme at issue, the court again used this description: 
[T]he more precise issue in the pending appeal is whether the arguable 
tension between the definitional section . . . and [the third prong of the 
anti-retaliation provision] creates sufficient ambiguity as to the coverage 
of [the third prong] to oblige us to give Chevron deference to the SEC’s 
rule.198 
                                                                                                                                
Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2007)). The court found that 
the existence of ambiguity warranted Chevron deference and also invoked the rule against 
surplusage in support of the “narrow exception” reading. See id. For a district court decision 
rejecting these decisions, see Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640 (E.D. 
Wisc. 2014) (“In short, the belief that there is some kind of conflict in the statute is based on 
a flawed understanding of the concept of statutory ambiguity.”). 
190  See Asadi v. G.E. Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625–26 (5th Cir. 2013). 
191  Id. at 625 (“The three categories listed in [15 U.S.C.] § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) represent the pro-
tected activity in a whistleblower-protection claim. They do not, however, define which in-
dividuals qualify as whistleblowers.”). 
192  Id. at 626. 
193  Id. at 628. 
194  See id. 
195  See, e.g., Pacella, supra note 175, at 743–48. 
196  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015). 
197  Id. at 146 (emphasis added). Perhaps even more tellingly, the court explicitly compared 
the situation to the Supreme Court’s decision on the Affordable Care Act in King v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015), discussed in the following section of this article as another 
example of absurdity in disguise. See id. at 150, 155; infra Section III.C. 
198  Id. at 148 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984)). 
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The Second Circuit invoked “tension” (although not direct conflict) be-
tween two provisions at issue, along with one provision’s last-minute addition 
during the legislative process—this latter argument, ironically, typically used to 
justify the textualist approach to statutory interpretation. Turning to its analysis, 
the court determined that although there was “no absolute conflict” between the 
two provisions, it nevertheless agreed with the findings of many district courts 
that there was tension between the provisions.199 The court examined the legis-
lative history for a resolution and found nothing directly on point, but did note 
that the anti-retaliation third prong had been inserted close to the end of the 
drafting process.200 While the court acknowledged that statutorily defined terms 
generally are to be read literally and applied throughout the applicable portions 
of the statute, it found these general rules inapposite in light of prong three’s 
late insertion in the statute.201 The court cited the complexities of the legislative 
process in support of this finding.202 The court noted that the realities of legisla-
tive drafting also suggested that the last-minute insertion of the third anti-
retaliation prong may have been done hastily and without the intent that it be 
limited by the narrow definition provision.203 Essentially, the tension at least 
raised the question of congressional intent; because the court could not resolve 
the question based on the text or using legislative history, it found the statute 
ambiguous.204 “[T]he tension [in the DFA] renders [it] sufficiently ambiguous 
to oblige us to give Chevron deference . . . . [W]e need not resolve the ambigui-
ty ourselves, but will defer to the reasonable interpretive rule adopted by the 
appropriate agency.”205 
Stunningly, while couching its reasoning in terms of an ambiguity analysis, 
the court initially compared the case to Holy Trinity Church,206 the classic 
paragon of the absurdity doctrine. Most significantly, the court appeared to 
back away from the comparison, finding that another case was “[c]loser” to the 
                                                        
199  See id. at 150–51. 
200  See id. at 152–55. 
201  See id. at 154. 
202  Id. The court also used its legislative process arguments to reject arguments from both 
parties invoking the rule against surplusage, which was a key component of the Asadi court’s 
decision and many district court rulings on the issue. See id. Even textualists concede that 
the rule should be one of the earliest to jettison precisely because of the realities of legisla-
tive drafting. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 176, 179. Overall, the court’s invocation of 
these arguments demonstrates the significant influence of textualism on modern statutory 
interpretation—even courts ultimately guided by statutory purpose and congressional intent 
take pains to justify their decisions using textualist doctrine. 
203  Berman, 801 F.3d at 154–55. 
204  See id. at 155. 
205  Id. (emphasis added). Notably, the Supreme Court resolved the DFA circuit split in 2018 
in Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 776 (2018). Upon concluding that the stat-
utory definition unambiguously includes only those whistleblowers who report to the SEC, 
the Court declined to apply Chevron deference to the SEC’s interpretation of the rule. Id. at 
782. 
206  Berman, 801 F.3d at 150. 
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case at bar—King v. Burwell,207 the Supreme Court’s decision on the Afforda-
ble Care Act (“ACA”). In Burwell, the Court considered a definitional provi-
sion of the ACA that appeared to limit the availability of income tax subsidies 
to those insured through state-established, but not federally-established health 
exchanges.208 However, that limitation would have undermined the statutory 
scheme and appeared vastly at odds with what the ACA was purportedly de-
signed to do.209 As discussed in further detail in Section III.D, Burwell is an-
other case in which a court used the anomalous result of applying apparently 
plain text to conclude that statutory text was ambiguous. 
This case exhibits a fairly low, Holy Trinity Church-type conception of ab-
surdity, where the apparent meaning is not literally illogical or incomprehensi-
ble, but nevertheless odd and inconsistent with what is known about the pur-
pose of the statute. But even as the Second Circuit recognized the parallels 
between its reasoning and Holy Trinity Church,210 it ultimately characterized its 
decision as grounded in statutory ambiguity—“[c]loser” to King v. Burwell.211 
The concept of ambiguity in disguise reveals that both of the Second Circuit’s 
comparisons were accurate because, in substance, King v. Burwell212 operated 
precisely the same way as Holy Trinity Church.213 The decisions differ primari-
ly in characterization, not operation: the hallmarks of absurdity in disguise.214 
C. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
The Supreme Court of the United States confronted the first major chal-
lenge to the ACA in 2012 in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
                                                        
207  Id. 
208  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490–91 (2015). 
209  See id. at 2493. The Berman court’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s King v. Burwell 
decision is some of the strongest evidence of absurdity in disguise in all the opinions exam-
ined herein—in fact, absurdity is nearly unmasked. 
210  Berman, 801 F.3d at 150. 
211  Id. 
212  See generally Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2480. 
213  See generally Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
214  Professor Richard M. Re previously identified the connection between Holy Trinity 
Church, King v. Burwell, Bond v. United States, and Yates v. United States. See Re, supra 
note 120, at 408–17. However, like other scholars, he views “the New Holy Trinity” as an 
outright rejection of Justice Scalia’s version of strong textualism. See id. at 407–08 (noting 
that “purposivism seems to have evolved and, as a result, to have gotten the upper hand”). 
Further, Professor Re contends that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly and visibly em-
braced” a more purposive, pragmatic approach. Id. at 408. Earlier works by other scholars 
predicted similar outcomes, warning that “aggressive” textualists would doom their approach 
if they insisted on doctrinal rigidity and failed to acknowledge common ground already 
forged with purposivists. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 48. Professor Jonathan R. Siegel 
went further, contending that the core tenets of textualism could not be moderated and re-
main internally consistent; thus, textualism would necessarily, rather than contingently fail 
as a viable interpretive approach. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 169–73, 176. 
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Sebelius.215 Congress enacted the Patient Protection and ACA in 2010 with the 
goals of reducing health care costs and improving health insurance coverage 
rates in the United States.216 One of the ACA’s most significant provisions is an 
“individual mandate,” which requires most Americans to purchase health insur-
ance coverage; if an individual chooses not to do so, he or she must pay what 
the ACA calls a “penalty” to the Internal Revenue Service.217 In Sebelius, one 
of the challengers’ key arguments was that this central provision was an uncon-
stitutional exercise of Congress’ power because it extended beyond the reach of 
the Tax and Spend Clause under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.218 
The Government argued that the mandate should be interpreted not as re-
quiring individuals to purchase insurance, but as a tax on those who choose not 
to purchase it, despite the ACA’s mandatory language and characterization of 
the payment for noninsurance as a “penalty.”219 Addressing this contention, the 
majority of the Court noted that the “most straightforward reading of the man-
date is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance.”220 If that were the 
case, the mandate could not fall within Congress’ power to tax and spend.221 
And, as the Court had already ruled that the individual mandate was not within 
Congress’ commerce power, the mandate would be struck down if the Court 
found it beyond the Tax and Spend Clause.222 
Although the Court frequently used language evoking ambiguity, it is clear 
that the high stakes of the potential result—striking down the individual man-
date—was the lodestone of its opinion. The most persuasive support for this 
proposition can be found in the Court’s own words: “The text of a statute can 
sometimes have more than one possible meaning . . . . And it is well established 
that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitu-
tion, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”223 As another ex-
ample: “The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of 
the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one. As we have ex-
                                                        
215  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 530–31 (2012). 
216  Id. at 538. 
217  Id. at 539. 
218  See id. at 540. Additionally, the challengers contended that the ACA was impermissible 
under the Commerce Clause, the other constitutional provision invoked by the Government 
in support of Congress’ authority to enact the law. See id. Finally, the challengers also dis-
puted the constitutionality of the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid. See id. at 541. 
219  Id. at 562, 564. It is worth noting here that the Court also conceded that the Govern-
ment’s proposed reading of the statute was entirely at odds with the reading it advocated in 
support of its primary argument that the ACA was authorized by the Commerce Clause. See 
id. at 561. Moreover, the Court determined that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar it from 
hearing the case on the ground that the ACA described the individual mandate as imposing a 
“penalty,” not a tax. See id. at 564. 
220  Id. at 562. 
221  See id. 
222  See id. at 561. 
223  Id. at 562. 
19 NEV. L.J. 741, DOVE 5/27/2019  4:23 PM 
Spring 2019] ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE 779 
plained, ‘every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a 
statute from unconstitutionality.’ ”224 And, most explicitly: 
It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command that 
it is necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only because we 
have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that § 5000A can be 
interpreted as a tax.225 
These quotes evidence more than just a low threshold for an initial finding 
of ambiguity—on the contrary, the ambiguity finding was the result of the con-
sequences of its absence. Significantly, the Court called the interpretation of the 
mandate as a penalty both the “most straightforward” and “the most natural” 
reading.226 These descriptions seem far more akin to the characteristics of the 
ordinary meaning favored by modern judges than to hyperliteralism of earlier 
forms of “plain meaning” textualism. It is certainly uncharacteristic of “classic” 
ambiguity given that the Court explicitly found one interpretation clearly more 
plausible than another. In virtually every instance, a statutory provision could 
be given more than one possible meaning—after all, were this not the case, the 
absurdity doctrine’s solution of treating clear texts as ambiguous would never 
resolve any of the problems it was designed to confront. Even minimal stand-
ards of ambiguity typically require multiple plausible meanings at the very 
least.227 Also tellingly, the Court’s description of the interpretation ultimately 
adopted as “fairly possible” is prototypical of the interpretations adopted in ab-
surdity cases: even though a statute seems clear, a less intuitive, less obvious 
meaning is adopted instead to avoid undesirable consequences. Thus, Sebelius 
also exemplifies the feasibility of employing ambiguity due to the concept’s 
malleability. 
D. King v. Burwell and Halbig v. Burwell 
The second major challenge to the ACA arose in King v. Burwell,228 a 
Fourth Circuit decision that was eventually reviewed by the Supreme Court. At 
the same time the Fourth Circuit ruled in King, the D.C. Circuit ruled in a case 
brought on the same grounds in Halbig v. Burwell.229 The majority in Halbig 
offers an interesting contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s decision, so it is also exam-
ined below after a brief overview of the issues under review. 
In these cases, the plaintiffs challenged an IRS rule passed under the au-
thority of the ACA that authorized tax credits for individuals who purchased 
                                                        
224  Id. at 563 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)). 
225  Id. at 574. 
226  Id. at 562–63. The Court’s belief that this interpretation was the “most natural” can be 
inferred from the Court’s statement that “[t]he question is not whether that is the most natu-
ral interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.” See id. at 563 
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
227  See, e.g., JELLUM, supra note 21, at 87–88. 
228  King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
229  Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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insurance through either state-run or federally-run health exchanges.230 The es-
tablishment of state exchanges is governed by ACA § 1311, which requires 
each state to establish a health exchange.231 A separate provision, § 1321, pro-
vides that if a state elects not to establish its own exchange, the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) “shall . . . establish and 
operate such Exchange within the State . . . .”232 In the definition section of the 
ACA, “Exchange” is defined as “an American Health Benefit Exchange” estab-
lished under § 1311.233 
In tandem with the individual mandate (the subject of the previous major 
challenge to the statute), the ACA provided for tax credits to subsidize the pur-
chase of health insurance as another means of making coverage affordable.234 
This “premium assistance credit” is calculated based on a taxpayer’s monthly 
premiums for a health plan “enrolled in through an Exchange established by the 
State under [§ 1311 of the ACA] . . . .”235 Finally, the term “State” is defined in 
the statute consistent with normal usage (i.e., not including the federal govern-
ment).236 The plaintiffs in King and Halbig argued that the text of the ACA 
plainly limits these premium tax credits to individuals purchasing insurance 
through state exchanges because a federally-established exchange cannot be 
“an Exchange established by the State . . .”237 Thus, the IRS rule purporting to 
provide them to those insured through federal exchanges is contrary to the 
ACA.238 
1. King v. Burwell in the Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the plain lan-
guage of the text precluded the IRS rule. Instead, the court found that the statu-
tory text was “ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations”239 while ac-
knowledging at the same time that “there is a certain sense to the plaintiffs’ 
position” that “the language says what it says[.]”240 The majority went on to 
remark that the plaintiffs’ arguments had “common-sense appeal” and that “a 
literal reading of the statute undoubtedly accords more closely with their posi-
tion.”241 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that Congress could have used 
broader language—as it did in other places throughout the statute—had it in-
                                                        
230  See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 395; King, 759 F.3d at 364. 
231  See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 394; King, 759 F.3d at 364. 
232  See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012). 
233  Id. § 18031(b)(1). 
234  See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012). 
235  Id. (emphasis added). 
236  42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (2012). 
237  Halbig, 758 F.3d at 398; King, 759 F.3d at 368. 
238  Halbig, 758 F.3d at 398; King, 759 F.3d at 368. 
239  King, 759 F.3d at 363. 
240  Id. at 368. 
241  Id. at 369. 
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tended to provide the tax credits to persons insured in both state and federal ex-
changes.242 
Still, at first blush, the court’s ambiguity finding appears to be textually-
based, rather than policy-based. As noted, § 1311 purports to require each state 
to establish a health exchange and provides that “[a]n Exchange shall be a gov-
ernmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by a State.”243 Moreo-
ver, the ACA’s definition section defines the statutory term “Exchange” as “an 
American Health Benefit Exchange” established under [§ ] 1311.244 However, 
§ 1321 of the ACA provides that the states may elect whether to establish an 
exchange under § 1311; in the event that a state does not, § 1321(c) requires 
that the federal government do so.245 The court emphasized the language of 
§ 1321(c), which provides that the HHS Secretary “ ‘shall . . . establish and op-
erate such Exchange within the State . . .’ ”246 The court concluded that the ref-
erence to “such Exchange” could operate to make federally-established ex-
changes the equivalent of state exchanges under § 1311—thus, by definition, 
exchanges established by a state.247 
The majority noted repeatedly that it found this construction more persua-
sive than the plaintiffs’.248 Notably, in a concurring opinion, Judge Davis 
agreed with this conclusion to such an extent that he found the statute unam-
biguous.249 Even while characterizing the plaintiffs’ reading as the “straight-
forward” one, he concluded that their reading “strips away any and all possible 
explanations for why Congress would have intended to exclude consumers who 
purchase health insurance coverage on federally-run Exchanges from qualify-
ing for premium tax credits.”250 Congress could not have intended “a reading 
that has no legislative history to support it and runs contrary to the Act’s text, 
structure, and goals” and which would “render[] the entire Congressional 
scheme nonsensical.”251 
Although the majority declined to adopt the concurring judge’s conclusion 
that the statute was clear, it was by no means blind to the policy consequences 
noted in the concurrence. On the contrary, the majority found it was “clear that 
widely available tax credits are essential to fulfilling the Act’s primary goals 
and that Congress was aware of their importance when drafting the bill.”252 In-
deed, “the economic framework supporting the Act would crumble if the cred-
                                                        
242  Id. at 368. 
243  42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1) (2012). 
244  Id. § 18031(b)(1). 
245  See id. § 18041. 
246  King, 759 F.3d at 369 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1321(c)). 
247  Id. 
248  See id. at 369–71. 
249  See id. at 378 (Davis, J., concurring). 
250  Id. 
251  Id. 
252  Id. at 374. 
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its were unavailable on federal Exchanges” and “without an exception to the 
individual mandate, millions more Americans unable to purchase insurance 
without the credits would be forced to pay a penalty that Congress never envi-
sioned imposing on them.”253 “Tellingly, the plaintiffs do not dispute that the 
premium tax credits are an essential component of the Act’s viability.”254 
Significantly, however, the majority addressed the implications of the 
competing constructions only after finding the statute ambiguous and as part of 
its analysis of whether to afford Chevron deference to the IRS interpretation of 
the statute.255 The quotes in the preceding paragraph supported the court’s con-
clusion that the IRS rule was a permissible construction of the statute and thus 
entitled to Chevron deference.256 As evidenced by the concurrence, it would 
certainly have been possible to use the quoted propositions to bolster the con-
clusion that the statute unambiguously permitted the availability of credits for 
federal exchange insureds—though that would require a much more transpar-
ently purposive interpretive approach. At the same time, in a literal sense, a 
federally-established exchange cannot be an exchange “established by the 
State.” The majority was unwilling to disregard the literal, “common sense” 
reading of the text, but neither could it ignore the implications of rigid adher-
ence to it. Invoking Chevron—which requires an analysis of whether an agen-
cy’s interpretation is permissible, not whether it is consistent with the most nat-
ural reading (i.e., ordinary meaning)—permitted the court to consider policy 
implications indirectly, through the discussion of the competing concerns 
weighed by the agency. The court’s use of ambiguity to open the door to Chev-
ron is even more noteworthy given the court admitted that it found the Gov-
ernment’s construction more persuasive than the plaintiffs’, despite noting the 
“literal” import of the text and “the common-sense appeal of the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument . . .”257 And, as noted, the concurring opinion offered a path to the same 
result without a finding of ambiguity. The majority’s ambivalence evinces a re-
luctance to adopt overtly purposive reasoning and a discomfort with the results 
of adopting a “purely” textualist approach.258 Finding the text ambiguous per-
                                                        
253  Id. at 375. 
254  Id. 
255  See id. at 373–75. 
256  See id. 
257  Id. at 369. 
258  I do not contend here that textualism would necessarily or indisputably require a finding 
that the tax credits were unavailable to consumers in federal exchanges. As emphasized 
throughout this article and in the literature on modern textualism generally, textualism does 
not seek “hyper-literal” interpretations; instead, the meanings of statutory terms are to be 
considered contextually. Of course, the scope of that context and the dividing line between 
literal and hyper-literal interpretations are debated even among judges and scholars self-
identifying as textualist. However, Justice Scalia, textualism’s most prominent proponent, 
later took the position that textualism clearly mandated the plaintiffs’ construction. See King 
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496–97 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although admittedly 
speculative, the claim that most judges and scholars familiar with his work would have ex-
pected this outcome does not seem overly controversial. 
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mitted the incorporation of statutory purpose and policy into the majority’s de-
cision in a less controversial way than the concurrence’s overtly results-
oriented approach.259 
2. Halbig v. Burwell in the D.C. Circuit 
In the same month the Fourth Circuit ruled in King v. Burwell,260 the D.C. 
Circuit ruled in Halbig v. Burwell, 261 a case raising the same challenge to the 
availability of tax credits to insurance purchasers in federal exchanges under 
the IRS’s interpretation of the ACA. The D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion 
reached a result different from both the majority and concurring opinions of the 
Fourth Circuit in King: the court ruled that the ACA unambiguously permitted 
tax credits only for purchasers of insurance in state exchanges because federal 
exchanges are not exchanges established by a state.262 
The D.C. Circuit agreed that § 1321’s requirement that HHS establish 
“such Exchange” in the event that a state elects not to do so created an equiva-
lence between state and federal exchanges “in terms of what they are and the 
statutory authority under which they are established.”263 However, the court 
found that this equivalence did not extend to the treatment of state and federal 
exchanges for the purpose of the tax credits because the “subsidies also turn on 
a third attribute of Exchanges: who established them.”264 The “such Exchange” 
language in § 1321, while referencing § 1311, did not make federally-
established exchanges “established by the State” simply in virtue of being 
treated as established under the same statutory provision.265 The court empha-
sized that Congress easily could have ensured that federal exchanges were 
treated exactly like state exchanges by explicitly requiring it—as it did, in fact, 
with respect to exchanges created by U.S. territories, in which case the territo-
ries are to “be treated as a State.”266 
The majority also rejected a dissenting judge’s argument that § 1311(d)(1) 
provided this equivalency, concluding instead that it is not a definition sec-
tion.267 The ACA’s definition section simply defines exchanges as those estab-
lished under § 1311.268 The court concluded it would be incongruous at best for 
                                                        
259  And, as noted, the primacy of statutory text is well-established in Supreme Court prece-
dent on interpretation and textualism’s influence on this precedent is widely acknowledged. 
Thus, we should expect that Fourth Circuit judges concerned with properly adhering to prec-
edent would be wary of undermining statutory text and, thus, inclined to couch their reason-
ing in textualist-leaning terms. 
260  King, 759 F.3d at 359. 
261  Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
262  Id. at 393–94. 
263  Id. at 399–400. 
264  Id. at 400. 
265  Id. at 398–99. 
266  See id. at 400. 
267  See id. at 400–01. 
268  See id. at 399 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–91(d)(21)). 
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Congress to choose § 1311, which authorizes state exchanges, as the place to 
alter the ACA’s general definition of exchange and essentially create a legal 
fiction with regard to the treatment of federal exchanges.269 
The court next considered and rejected the Government’s argument that the 
plaintiffs’ construction of the text rendered various other provisions of the 
ACA absurd. Emphasizing the high threshold for absurdity and the concerns 
that broad versions of the absurdity doctrine pose for “the rule-of-law objec-
tives implicit in the Constitution’s strict separation of lawmaking from judg-
ing,”270 the court found that no result of applying the plain meaning of the text 
was irreconcilable with either the apparent or conceivable purpose of the statu-
tory scheme.271 Moreover, the court emphasized the vagaries of the legislative 
bargaining process, noting that the Supreme Court has cautioned that “no legis-
lation pursues its purposes at all costs.”272 
Significantly, the majority concluded by admitting that it reached its deci-
sion “frankly, with reluctance” given the “major consequences” and “high . . . 
stakes” involved.273 Nevertheless, “Congress is supreme in matters of policy, 
and the consequence of that supremacy is that our duty when interpreting a 
statute is to ascertain the meaning of the words of the statue duly enacted 
through the formal legislative process.”274 
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision in King v. Burwell 
In light of the conflicting opinions of the Fourth and D.C. Circuits in King 
and Halbig, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in King v. Burwell275 to con-
sider the validity of the IRS rule making tax credits available to insureds in 
both state and federal exchanges. After briefly reviewing the history and key 
mechanisms of the ACA, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, ad-
dressed whether Chevron deference should be afforded to the IRS.276 Breaking 
                                                        
269  See id. at 400–01. 
270  See id. at 402 (summarizing John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2387, 2434–35 (2003)). 
271  See id. at 402–06. 
272  Id. at 411 (citations omitted). 
273  Id. at 412. 
274  Id. A concurring opinion filed in the case was even more matter of fact in its textualist 
underpinnings, arguing that adopting the Government’s construction “would be to engage in 
distortion, not interpretation.” See id. (Randolph, J., concurring). On the contrary, a vigorous 
dissent filed by Judge Edwards would have found the statute ambiguous, largely on the 
ground that the plaintiffs’ construction would “thwart a central element of the ACA.” See id. 
at 413 (Edwards, J., dissenting). “It is inconceivable that Congress intended to give States 
the power to cause the ACA to ‘crumble.’ ” Id. While the dissent in Halbig is a paradigmatic 
example of absurdity in disguise, the opinion is not discussed in detail here to avoid redun-
dancy in light of its similarity to the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in its review of King 
v. Burwell. See infra Part III.D.3. 
275  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
276  See id. at 2488–89. 
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from the approaches of the lower courts, the Court summarily ruled that even if 
the ACA was ambiguous, Chevron was inapposite.277 The significance of the 
issue from both a political and economic standpoint made this one of the rare 
and “extraordinary” cases in which it is inconceivable that Congress could have 
intended to delegate the decision to an agency.278 Rather, the majority conclud-
ed that even if the statutory language was ambiguous, the resolution of its 
meaning must be determined by the Court.279 
The Court next turned to the text of the relevant statutory provisions, em-
phasizing the importance of context and the broad statutory scheme in the de-
termination of the meaning of statutory text.280 Relying in part on the “such Ex-
change” language of § 1321, the Court found that the phrase “an Exchange 
established by the state under [§ 1311]” was ambiguous.281 Although the Court 
acknowledged that the phrase “established by the State” would be entirely su-
perfluous had Congress intended that the credits be available for both state and 
federal exchanges, it brushed this concern aside on the ground that the canon 
against surplusage is “not absolute.”282 More tellingly, the Court noted the 
“such Exchange” language only after an extensive discussion of healthcare re-
form in the United States going back to the 1990s.283 Moreover, the Court 
frankly acknowledged that the Government’s interpretation was not the “most 
natural reading.”284 Nevertheless, that reading was adopted because it was most 
consistent with the Court’s view of the purpose of the legislation—surely, the 
Court noted, Congress must have intended the tax credits to make the ACA 
work; it could not have intended to embed a limitation that would ultimately 
destroy legislative scheme.285 
In King, Sebelius, and Bond, the Supreme Court invoked the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine in justification for finding ambiguity. As noted, other schol-
ars have identified the reverse-constitutional avoidance doctrine and have 
pointed to Bond and other examples. While that insight is invaluable, this arti-
cle demonstrates that the phenomenon displayed in those cases is actually much 
broader and more prevalent. The reverse-avoidance doctrine is more properly 
viewed as but one iteration of absurdity in disguise. Although the scope of the 
absurdity doctrine has waxed and waned, its hallmark is permitting courts to 
treat otherwise clear statutory text as ambiguous in order to avoid an absurd re-
sult (based on whatever degree or severity of absurdity is accepted in the par-
                                                        
277  See id. at 2489. 
278  Id. at 2488–89 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. Drug Admin. v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). 
279  See id. at 2492. 
280  See id. 
281  See id. at 2489–90. 
282  See id. at 2490, 2492 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lamie v. United States 
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004)). 
283  See id. at 2485. 
284  Id. at 2495. 
285  See id. at 2496. 
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ticular version employed). Not only does the reverse-avoidance doctrine share 
this hallmark, the cases which exhibit it demonstrate that its application is strik-
ingly similar to analyses in other cases where constitutional consequences do 
not arise. The key factor is the absence of ex ante ambiguity; the ambiguity 
finding comes only after examining the consequences of applying apparent 
statutory meaning ex post. 
Finally, unconstitutionality is certainly consistent with some versions of the 
absurdity doctrine: the presumption that Congress would not intentionally enact 
an unconstitutional statute rests at least in part on the feeling that it would be 
ridiculous (or at least unreasonable) for it to do so. Arguably, even the most 
grossly unfair or anomalous result of applying a statute in a particular case is 
less a concern than a potentially unconstitutional result. And even Justice Scalia 
has raised the specter of unconstitutionality as a consideration warranting the 
use of the absurdity doctrine.286 “Reverse avoidance” may share a name and 
similar concerns with traditional avoidance, but its operation and effect are far 
more akin to the absurdity doctrine. 
E. Yates v. United States 
After harvesting undersized red grouper while fishing in federal waters off 
the Gulf of Mexico, the defendant, John Yates, instructed a crew member to 
throw the fish of questionable size overboard in order to prevent their discovery 
during a routine inspection by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission.287 For reasons unknown even to the Court, Yates was charged 
with federal crimes more than thirty-two months later.288 After being indicted 
and convicted, Yates appealed his conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1519, 
which provides: 
“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, fal-
sifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object 
with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or 
proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any de-
partment or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, 
or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”289 
Notably, the statute was codified after being enacted as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, sweeping new financial legislation in response to the ethical 
breaches leading to the implosion of Enron.290 
Although the majority opinion concluded that a fish is, indeed, a tangible 
object, the Court nonetheless declined to interpret § 1519 to encompass Yates’ 
                                                        
286  See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528–29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). 
287  See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1078 (2015). 
288  Id. at 1080. 
289  Id. at 1078 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519). 
290  Id. at 1079. 
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conduct. The Court emphasized that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to 
address “corporate and accounting deception and cover-ups . . .”291 In light of 
the statutory history, the broad and unqualified term “[t]angible object” in 
§ 1519 should be read to include only tangible objects “use[d] to record or pre-
serve information . . . .”292 
The Court’s opinion is rife with references to the statute’s purpose and 
Congress’ likely intent. The Court acknowledged that “[t]he ordinary meaning 
of an ‘object’ that is ‘tangible,’ as stated in dictionary definitions, is ‘a discrete 
. . . thing.’ ”293 However, the majority found that this alone did not preclude a 
finding of ambiguity, because ambiguity must be determined in context.294 To 
that end, the majority employed a variety of canons of construction, considered 
statutory headings and titles, and considered the broader purposes of the statute 
in the context of its passage as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.295 Significantly, 
these tools were used not only to resolve the ambiguity in question, but to bol-
ster the ambiguity finding itself. Like Bond, the Court’s approach here was to 
narrow a broad statutory term to more closely align with its apparent purpose, 
but under the guise of an ambiguity finding. 
CONCLUSION 
Textualism’s monumental influence, especially in Supreme Court prece-
dent on interpretation, has elevated statutory text—not legislative purposes or 
intentions—to the forefront of the interpretive inquiry. Numerous decisions of 
the Court have instructed that where statutory text is unambiguous, it is to be 
applied as it is written—even if the outcome is odd or seems ill-advised from a 
policy perspective. Particularly in an increasingly polarized political environ-
ment, the devotion to text offers judges a way to minimize the perception of 
improper judicial legislating in conflict with our constitutional structure. 
Nevertheless, in practice, it is difficult to ignore the implications in a case 
such as King or Sebelius, where the viability of an entire legislative overhaul of 
the health insurance market in the United States is at risk. Or in a case where 
significant international issues and longstanding traditions in our federalist sys-
tem are at stake, as in Bond. And some cases, such as Bond and Yates, reveal 
the fairly outlandish, ridiculous results that can occur where very broad statutes 
are applied in specific circumstances. Debates abound over the desirability and 
propriety of considering results as part of statutory interpretation. But regard-
less of one’s stance in this debate, the role of consequences in statutory inter-
pretation may be inevitable. 
                                                        
291  Id. 
292  Id. at 1081. 
293  Id. (alteration in original). 
294  See id. at 1081–82. 
295  See id. at 1081–89. 
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The intersection of this inevitability with textualism’s success is the root of 
the development of the phenomenon of “absurdity in disguise.” Related to, yet 
distinct from purposivism, absurdity in disguise allows judges to claim a varie-
ty of textualist precepts as their own while embracing results-oriented interpre-
tations that would typically be impermissible under “pure” or strict textualism. 
Yet this “best of both worlds” approach may suffer from conceptual incoher-
ence if its closeness to purposivism continues to be minimized in the courts. 
